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This publication consists of two papers: the first "Gang Organization 
and Migration" is a descriptive work based on interviews with 
California inmates during the Spring and Summer of 1988 and 1989. 
The second, "Drugs, Gangs, and Law Enforcement" is more reflective 
in tone and describes interviews with and observations oflaw 
enforcement responses to gang migration. 
GANG ORGANIZATION AND MIGRATION 
Gang kids and street crime are scarcely a novel feature of 
the urban American landscape - although many of us 
long for the good old days of safe streets. The benchmark 
study of the urban gang is still Frederick Thrasher's of 
1,313 Chicago gangs, first published in 1927.1 The 
disorder and violence of these gangs appalled Thrasher. 
He observed that the gangs were beyond the ordinary 
controls of police and other social agencies, beyond the 
pale of civil society. He saw "regions of conflict" that 
were "like a frontier." He described gang youth as 
"lawless, godless, wild." 
Of these youthful gangsters, only 7.2 percent were 
"Negro." Located in economically disadvantaged 
neighborhoods, the Chicago gangs of the 1920s were 
composed of children of immigrants -mostly Poles, 
Italians and Irish, mixed with Jews, Slavs, Germans and 
Swedes. Their moral posture seems scarcely different 
from today's black youth. "Stealing, the leading predatory 
activity of the adolescent gang," Thrasher wrote, "is 
regarded as perfectly natural and contains no more moral 
opprobrium for the gang boy than smoking a cigarette." 
Today's youthful gangsters sell illegal drugs, particularly 
crack cocaine, with similar moral abandon. And armed 
with semi-automatic military weapons, they are capable 
of far greater injury to themselves and others. 
It was in light of these public and law enforcement 
concerns that we began our research on street drug 
dealing, particularly cocaine trafficking, in the summer of 
1988. At that time, there was increasing interest on the 
part of the general public and law enforcement officials 
about the role played by street gangs, particularly Los 
Angeles street gangs, in drug sales and street violence 
within California. There was also some controversy over 
the issue since law enforcement officials perceived the 
gangs to be playing an increasing role in drug selling, 
while the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored 
research by University of Southern California (USC) 
sociologists Malcolm W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson 
found these perceptions of gang involvement to be 
exaggerated.2 Based on our interviews, and 
reinterpretation of their data, we did not. With that 
background, we addressed five questions in our earlier 
report: 1) How is drug distribution in California related to 
the gang phenomenon? 2) How are youngsters socialized 
into the drug business? 3) How is street drug dealing 
organized? 4) What sort of financial and contractual 
arrangements does street drug dealing entail? 5) What is 
the market? 
This summer (1989) we continued to study these 
questions, while concentrating on three others: Why have 
gang members migrated to sell drugs in other areas in the 
United States, as well as to other parts of California? How 
has law enforcement responded to the gang migration 
phenomenon? How effective is the law enforcement 
response in reducing the supply of drugs, the demand for 
drugs and the displacement of drugs from one jurisdiction 
to another? 
Why have gang members 
migrated to sell drugs in other 
areas in the United States, as 
well as to other parts of 
California? How has law 
enforcement responded to the 
gang migration ... 
Clearly, gang migration to sell drugs is becoming a 
significant issue for criminological theory, public 
understanding and law enforcement policy. Thus, by late 
1988 police departments all over the country, from 
Shreveport, Louisiana, to Kansas City, Missouri to 
Seattle, Washington were reporting that California gang 
members were extending their operations. Law 
enforcement agents have often convened to discuss this 
issue. For example, the FBI's Kansas City, Missouri, field 
office and the Kansas City Police Department invited law 
enforcement officials from Los Angeles and seven other 
cities- Sacramento, Denver, Seattle, Oklahoma City, 
Phoenix, Portland, Oregon and Anchorage, Alaska- to 
discuss problems caused by the hundreds of Los Angeles 
gang members who are travelling out of town to sell 
cocaine.3 
From the perspective of criminological theory, two polar 
and conflicting theories seem plausible as explanations of 
gang member migration. At one pole is the organized 
crime infiltration or "mafia" theory. Under it, street gangs 
have evolved into sophisticated organized crime groups, 
who consciously evaluate and target particular markets. 
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Members are assigned territories to work, while 
maintaining strong economic and filial links with the host 
gang. 
... gang culture generates 
values and understandings and 
trust relationships, which 
facilitate but do not direct the 
1nigration of members. 
The symbolic association theory lies at the other 
explanatory pole. In that view, a young man from the old 
neighborhood, who may or may not have been an active 
gang member, migrates to a new city and sets up a new 
gang, with few or no links to the old gang, but using the 
Los Angeles gang name because of its panache. Based on 
our interviews with 60 inmates and wards of California 
Correctional Institutions, plus law enforcement and 
correctional local, county and state officials in California, 
plus federal officials and local police in Kansas City and 
Seattle, we shall argue that neither of these theories 
accurately captures reality. The relation between gangs, 
drugs and gang migration is neither as organized as the 
first model suggest<; nor as disconnected as the second. 
Instead, we propose that the data we have developed best 
fit what we are calling a "cultural resource" theory, which 
argues that gang culture generates values and 
understandings and trust relationships, which facilitate but 
do not direct the migration of members. Cultural gangs, 
we conclude, are initially organized horizontally, stressing 
values of neighborhood, loyalty, and the equality that 
obtains among members of a family. By contrast, 
Northern California gangs arc organized vertically, with 
status in the gang dependent upon role performance. 
This theory may also be applicable to Eastern gangs, such 
as the Jamaicans, and helps to explain a puzzling and 
otherwise inexplicable finding: that San Francisco Bay 
area gangs don't travel or travel very rarely- even to 
Sacramento- in contrast to Los Angeles based Bloods 
and Crips, who sell drugs from Shreveport, Louisiana to 
Seattle, Washington- as well as Sacramento. We 
believe that our research has uncovered an interesting and 
perhaps surprising paradox: that gangs which were 
initially culturally organized can draw upon more 
resources to support migration to sell an illegal product 
than "entrepreneurial" gangs organized for the specific 
purpose of selling drugs. To understand why that is so it 
will be useful to review last year's findings supplemented 
by our interview findings from this year. 
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The Continued Rise of 
the Entrepreneurial Gang 
Our most recent. research partially supports one of the 
principal findings of our first report that California urban 
drug selling gangs can usefully be divided along 
"cultural" versus "instrumental" lines and that at least 
among African-American Los Angeles gangs there is a 
dynamic movement from the former towards the latter. 
Our major thesis is: as this occurs, the developing 
entrepreneurial activities of Los Angeles gang 
members are supported by the resources of traditional 
gang membership, which include horizontal 
organizational, loyalty norms and favored status. This 
foundation is especially important in shoring up migratory 
selling. By contrast, vertically organized entrepreneurial 
gangs do not enjoy these resources. 
Cultuml gangs, as we described in The Social Structure of 
Street Drug Dealing, typically hold respect, fraternity, 
trust, and loyalty to gang and neighborhood as bedrock 
values. These gangs are strongly grounded in 
neighborhood or territorial identity, tend to extend across 
( generations. While the cultural gang routinely engages in 
1 criminal activities including the black market, these gangs 
exist prior to and independent of the illegal activities in 
which they arc engaged. The criminal acts do not define 
either the identity of the gang or its individual 
members. Entrepreneurial gangs, by contrast, are 
business-focused with financial goals paramount. In these 
gangs, members enter the gang for instrumental 
(economic) reasons, fealty of gang membership tends to 
Cultural gangs employ violence 
predominantly as a symbolic 
aspect of gang loyalty and 
identity .... the entrepreneurial 
gang employs violence for the 
purpose of controlling drug-
selling territory or enforcing the 
loyalty norms of the operation, 
rather than for gang or social 
identity per se. 
depend on economic (usually drug-related) opportunities 
offered by leaders, and the gang is motivated by profits 
and the control of markets. These gangs tend to be viewed 
by their members as "organizations," and are considered 
as a strict "business" operation. 
The cultural gang is a tightly knit primary group, an 
1 extended family, in the interpretation offered by 
members. The entrepreneurial gang is like a business 
organization. Gang members may enjoy recreational 
activities together, similar to the way employees and 
managers of a small business do, but these activities are 
contingent, not central. A sociologist would say that the 
cultural gang operates within a symbolic interactionist 
framework, responding to previously developed social 
norms, while the entrepreneurial gang is purposively 
rational, valuing instrumental and strategic action.4 
How each gang type employs violence is central to 
understanding their different institutional frameworks. 
Cultural gangs employ violence predominantly as a 
symbolic aspect of gang loyalty and identity. 
Entrepreneurial gangs may employ violence with 
comparable savagery, but with different goals. That is, the 
entrepreneurial gang employs violence for the purpose of 
controlling drug-selling territory or enforcing the loyalty 
norms of the operation, rather than for gang or social 
identity per se. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department 
investigated 96 homicides in 1988. They identified only 
seven as "drug-related." The remainder were classified as 
"gang-related."5 The infamous Crips and Bloods gangs 
apparently do most of their violence over matters of 
honor. 
We observed in The Social Structure of Street Drug 
Dealing the dynamic movement of African-American Los 
Angeles gangs from symbolic interaction to the purposive 
rationality: "(1)he situation of the Los Angeles gangs .. 
seems to be changing, indeed dynamically so, as the 
values associated with drug marketing come to dominate 
members."6 And we continued, noting the specific 
importance of such attributes as initiative and ambition in 
African-American gangs and explained why these gangs 
are particularly likely to transform their role in the 
marketing of cocaine. 
Since crack cocaine appears to be the most profitable 
drug, and since crack cocaine is sold mainly by African-
American street dealers, the sale of that drug seems to 
have blurred the distinction between the cultural and the 
entrepreneurial gang. African-American L.A. cultural 
gangs, which were never as tightly identified with the 
neighborhood as Chicano gangs, are increasingly 
becoming instrumental in their relationship with drugs. 
African-American gangs seem to prize individual 
initiative and ambition as indicia of status. As a result, 
African-American L.A. cultural gangs seem increasingly 
to look like gangs instrumentally designed for the sale of 
drugs.7 
Our recent research suggests that the movement from the 
symbolic interactionist to the purposively rational mode 
has affected Hispanic gangs as well, although probably 
not as strongly as it has African-American gangs. In our 
current research, we found that both environmental 
factors- such as law enforcement efforts and increased 
drug selling competition - as well as the internal 
dynamics of the gangs are propelling this move towards 
professionalization and entrepreneurialization. It is also 
clear this change has become more pronounced over time. 
We note and elaborate on the movement here because of 
its important policy implications. 
It is clear from our interviews as well as from common 
sense that the changing role of urban gangs in street drug 
dealing is occurring against a dynamically changing 
community backdrop. The urban neighborhoods affected 
by gang, drug, and violent activity have come under 
intense public and police scrutiny, and related law 
enforcement efforts. The media have focused on such 
... environmental factors -
such as law enforcement efforts 
and increased drug selling 
competition - as well as the 
internal dynamics of the gangs 
are propelling this move 
towards professionalization and 
entrepreneurialization. 
neighborhoods - across the country - neighborhoods 
that have reportedly become saturated with the drug 
"epidemic" and where violence has escalated to 
unprecedented levels. 
Los Angeles has come to occupy perhaps the preeminent 
position in the United States for the importation of 
cocaine.8 As we stated in our previous report, the price of 
cocaine has fallen precipitously from $60,000 to $12,000 
a kilo. Some of our most recent interviews suggest that 
just in the last year this price has fallen further still, to 
$9,000-$10,000 a kilo. More recently, prices seem to have 
risen. 
Our current research confirms these public perceptions 
about the changing arena within which urban Los Angeles 
drug selling occurs. Our most recent inmate and ward 
respondents were almost unanimous in citing an increase 
in law enforcement efforts and pressure, an all-around 
tightening of the drug trade, and a major increase in the 
incidence of violence. Across the board, from Modesto to 
San Diego the respondents reported that law enforcement 
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has stepped up their efforts to curtail the drug trade and 
gang activity. 
Most importantly, there was near unanimity that these 
efforts were having an impact on their drug business, and 
this was particularly true for Los Angeles. The 
... seller participation in the 
·L.A. urban drug market is 
perceived to have become 
markedly more difficult, more 
dangerous, and less lucrative in 
just the last three years. 
interviewees were similarly in agreement on the 
tightening pressures of the illegal drug trade, citing such 
factors as the precipitous decrease in the cost of drugs and 
an increase in the number of drug dealers, the 
conspicuous success of many of those already involved in 
the drug trade, and the escalation and banalization of 
violence. 
It is clear, in other words, that seller participation in the 
L.A. urban drug market is perceived to have become 
markedly more difficult, more dangerous, and less 
lucrative in just the last three years. 
If we think of gang values and organization as potentially 
facilitative of drug marketing, the factors discussed above 
significantly affect the role of gangs in the Los Angeles 
drug business. Based on our interviews, we conclude that 
these factors have bolstered the power and position of the 
Los Angeles gangs, and we believe that this is fueling a 
transition from the cultural towards the entrepreneurial 
gang. 
Drug Salience in Cultural Gang Membership 
One strong indication of the shift from the cultural to the 
entrepreneurial gang is a change that seems to be 
occurring, at least in Los Angeles, in the ambition of 
youths that seek to join gangs. Some of our interviews for 
our earlier report suggested that individuals are being 
attracted to gangs not for what they represent to others in 
the neighborhood, but rather for what they represent in 
opportunities for drug dealing. Whereas simply joining 
the gang and attaining one of its more respected stations 
used to be the paramount, sometimes the only goal, it now 
seems that youths are increasingly interested in joining 
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the gang for the economic benefits conferred by such 
membership. Since 1985 these economic benefits have 
largely been associated with access to the world of drug 
dealing. In the words of one young gang member: 
"People joining, I figure myself, they join the 
gangs, because in the gangs, I guess if you got 
a gang behind you, you stronger. It's easier to 
distribute cocaine if you got a lot of people to 
sell to or to sell for you. It's safer because 
there's one person that come in our 
neighborhood that want to sell cocaine, if 
nobody know him, then whatever he got ... 
it's going to be ours ... "9 
Complimenting this shift in the motivation of youths 
joining Los Angeles gangs is a loosening of gang-
membership criteria in favor of one's involvement in the 
drug trade. Position in the drug business is increasingly 
becoming accepted as the new passport to status in 
traditionally cultural gangs. Our previous research 
showed that even within cultural gangs one can now 
attain the status of "homeboy" through adoption if one 
successfully sells drugs for another higher ranking 
homeboy, or even just brings drugs to the set. One of the 
respondents reported how this adoption mechanism 
worked: 
"If they sold dope for me, that would be my 
homeboy, and if he's my homeboy then he's 
everybody's homeboy. As they say workers, 
or whatever, that's my worker, so ... he's in 
with everybody. Something happen to him, 
it's all our responsibility just as it's his 
responsibility. "10 
A second commented on the changing criteria of 
membership: 
"Some people say they get walked on the set 
or jumped on the set ... Now it's different ... 
there's dudes I see here that be telling me 
they're from my neighborhood, and I'm 
sa yin', 'I don't know you. When did you get 
in our neighborhood?' But it's different 
because you got drugs - cocaine. "11 
"Most members of the clique would deal 
rock. Some members would take rock. But 
those that use the rock - we still consider 
them as homeboys- but we don't too much 
fuck with them because they's the one that's 
going to bring us down." 
" ... like if you is my homeboy and you start 
to smokin' dope and like, you was my 
acebone, and I see you going down the hill, 
every time I see you puffin' on something I'm 
going to beat you down until you stop." 
Drug Dealing Benefits of 
Cultural Gang Membership 
In The Social Structure of Street Drug Dealing we 
reported that being a member of a gang benefits and 
facilitates drug dealing success.12 This facilitation was 
apparent in a myriad of ways. Gangs, for example, offer a 
rich source of shared marketing information. Information 
about who sells what for what price and who has which 
drugs available is routinely and more easily 
communicated along gang lines. The gang member can 
Gangs, for example, offer a rich 
source of shared marketing 
information. 
also rely on his "homeboys" for protection and concerted 
retribution if anything were to happen to him on or 
outside his gang turf. Gang members, furthermore, enjoy 
easy access and control to territorial markets. They can 
sell drugs in their own neighborhood without intruding 
upon the turf of others. In return, they can exclude others 
from selling on their turf- and this territorial monopoly, 
as mentioned, is backed by force since the gang 
automatically protects against outside intruders. Finally, 
there is a well-developed and virtually sacrosanct sense of 
trust inhering in the "homeboy" relationship, so that gang 
members are expected not to betray other members to the 
police or rival gangs. 
One of our current respondents offered an interesting 
analogy pointing to this basic truism that being a member 
of a gang does facilitate drug dealing: 
"[Being a gang member] is just an easier way 
to get in [to drug dealing]. It's like if you 
going to get a job and you have a high school 
diploma. If you don't have one, you ain't 
gain' to get the job." 
Our current research confirms that the above advantages 
still benefit gang-affiliated dealers. It appears, moreover, 
that the benefits of gang membership have actually and 
even significantly increased over time. This is a second 
indication that traditionally cultural gangs are reorienting 
towards the drug trade, and the reorientation is further 
evidenced in several respects: 
First, the ready trade of drug dealing information within 
gangs has mushroomed and solidified into a full-blown 
apprenticeship system for those just entering the drug 
trade. This provides benefits both for the new inductees as 
well as for the more established dealers. Older gang 
members often not only introduce younger members to 
drug dealing but also routinely offer these younger 
members pre-packaged drugs on consignment, to be sold 
for easy "double-up" profit.13 This economic "good will" 
gesture is, if need be, accompanied by instruction in such 
things as the standard quantities of drugs to be sold, the 
going prices, whom to sell to and whom to avoid, the best 
locations to sell, and the best way to avoid being caught 
by police. In tum the older gang member-dealer can count 
on a steady peddler of his contraband. He can also call on 
the younger member to perform various illegal tasks -
ranging from holding drugs to working shifts in a rock 
house to carrying drugs between locations - to further 
insulate the older dealer from police scrutiny. 
Second, the type of drug dealing information being 
exchanged within gangs has expanded to encompass the 
new out-of-town and interstate drug trafficking 
operations. Information on the best and least risky, and 
least competitive out-of-town locations is now transmitted 
through the gang, as well as information on law 
enforcement presence and tactics in the various new 
locations. 
Third, the web of support expected of and provided to 
fellow gang members has expanded beyond mere 
protection, and it has become increasingly economic-
oriented. Such provision of support for fellow gang 
... the type of drug dealing 
information being exchanged 
within gangs has expanded to 
encompass the new out-of-town 
and interstate drug trafficking 
operations. 
members is expected on demand, and includes such things 
as lending money, fronting drugs, and providing guns for 
a "mission." In several of our most recent interviews we 
were told that the provision of this sort of support has 
gone beyond loans to include an expectation of outright 
gifts, usually of money or drugs but even of such things as 
clothes or a car. These gifts seem to be given under two 
circumstances - when a young apprenticing drug dealer 
has done particularly well he might be rewarded with 
gifts, or if a gang member goes to prison, largess is 
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expected both to keep him well-equipped in prison and to 
ease his transition back into the drug business upon his 
release. If a gang member fails to provide this sort of 
support to a fellow gang member in need, his reputation 
and thus standing are diminished: 
"If you was my homeboy and I asked you for 
(some money) and he says "no I can't," but 
you know he got it, and he refusing to assist 
another one of his homeboys, he got to go. 
Either somebody's going to rob him, kill him, 
or kick him off the set." 
· Yet gang support, we found, does not stop here. It now 
also includes an expectation - in addition to the fronted 
or free drugs and cash - of provision of bail money 
when a homeboy is caught, to enable a recently freed 
homeboy to function in the neighborhood (and in 
business). Gang members can also count on a relatively 
secure immunity from being ripped off, or "being jacked" 
as it is called, by fellow gang members. Finally, as 
always, gang members enjoy a special priority in 
obtaining drugs from their fellow members. Thus, gang 
membership offers one of the most secure, reliably 
consistent supply of drugs. 
Expanded Control of 
Drug Dealing Territories 
The ultimate drug dealing benefit conferred on gang 
members has been expanded gang - cultural gang -
control of drug selling territories. This control, in fact, 
appears to have intensified; so much so that it deserves 
independent consideration as a direct indication of the 
shift from the cultural towards the instrumental gang. Our 
'Gangs, they control ... they 
neighborhood. They control 
they neighborhood because it's 
gang territory.' 
most recent set of interviews suggests that gang control of 
drug dealing in urban Los Angeles neighborhoods has 
intensified as compared to our research just last summer. 
Several respondents speak to the new authority of the 
gangs in regulating local drug peddling: 
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"If they knew you, it was ok. That's the thing 
about it, you can't go in nobody else's 'hood 
and sell - you signing your own death 
warrant, if you do that." 
"Gangs, they control ... they neighborhood. 
They control they neighborhood because it's 
gang territory. But a person can move a drug 
house in that neighborhood, as long as they 
show the gang respect ... It's the way you 
present you' self." 
"In our neighborhood, can'tjust anybody 
come up there and sell drugs and stuff. If you 
not a enemy of ours, and you on the cool side, 
everything's alright. But other than that the 
homeboys, they keep a tight lock on the 
neighborhood. They don't let everybody 
come up there ... " 
The organization of street drug dealing has evolved to 
where one must at least obtain the tacit consent of the 
neighborhood gang, if not a more formalized business 
understanding, like providing a cut of the proceeds, to 
continue to operate. This control is evidenced primarily in 
three respects: gangs uniformly prevent rival gangs from 
selling in their neighborhood; the purview of independent 
dealers now is limited, except for wholesale distributors, 
whom we discuss elsewhere; gangs enforce their control 
by providing organized, concerted responses to breaches 
of their power, as, for example, offering protection to 
neighborhood drug dealers who might otherwise be 
ripped off. 
At the same time, no respondents reported that "sets" 
completely control the supply of drugs in the 
neighborhood. Sets, by virtue of their power in the 
neighborhood, might enjoy de facto control over drug 
supply, but this has never been reported as an explicit aim 
or accomplishment of a set. 
The New Ambition of Cultural Gangs 
Against these developments in the L.A. drug market we 
found an interesting and paradoxical counter-trend to the 
unabated rise of entrepreneurial values. Although the 
values of the cultural gang consistently protect and 
facilitate gang member participation in drug dealing, it 
now seems that the ascendance of drug dealing is 
undermining the cultural understanding of the gang. We 
note the emergence of this conflict in three key respects: 
First, as we reported in The Social Structure of Street 
Drug Dealing, participation in cultural gang violence, or 
"gang banging," traditionally has been one of the primary 
means for younger gang members to accumulate respect 
and position within the gang. While the continued 
importance of engaging in such violence should not be 
underestimated, our research does pick up a subtle change 
in orientation which seems to be occurring. It seems youth 
are now engaging in gang-related violence not simply to 
enhance their position within the gang, but rather to 
enhance their prospects in the drug trade, at least insofar 
as the trade is dominated by gang members in many 
neighborhoods. 
This change of emphasis is supplemented by the fact that 
attaining status and respect within the gang - assisting 
and participating in the drug dealing activities of older 
gang members - now seems to have taken on an 
independent significance for the younger members. 
"Coming up" in the gang now has as much to do with the 
money one is making as the overt acts committed in fealty 
to the gang. 
This shift away from the traditional activities of the gang 
may be undermining what is considered to be traditional 
conduct. Quite consistently it was reported that gang 
membership eventually culminates in the undistracted 
pursuit of drug sales. One older gang member reflected on 
this diminution of older gang members' involvement in 
the gang in favor of full-time drug dealing: 
"Like, ... some of them [fellow gang 
members] see themselves as high rollers ... 
they done got too old, so they not really into 
gang banging anymore. It's the younger 
generation that's comin' up. The people my 
age [20], they kickin' back now, they out 
selling drugs and kickin' back now; they 
lookin' to the future. You got the people 
under us comin' up and they doin' the drive-
by's and all that because they trying to make a 
name for theyself. They tryin' to make a 
reputation .... The reputation helps them out 
... movin' up the ladder." 
Another member put it more baldly: 
"It's hard to do it [gang banging] if you got a 
lot of money. Cause you can't put all your 
time into trying to kill somebody else, and 
selling dope- you can't do it. You goin' to 
jail sooner or later for a long time. So either 
you gonna try and have some money and go 
to jail like that for a long time, or you're 
gonna try and kill. People who got it good as 
far as selling dope, they stop gang banging, 
they don't do it no more." 
Partners out of Enemies: The Rise of 
Inter-gang Transactions 
Our most recent research suggests a decrease in gang 
loyalty in favor of drug dealing aims - ripoffs, snitching 
-particularly in light of the tightening L.A. market and 
the increase of police pressure. 
"I notice its [loyalty] changing a bit now, 
'cause now they givin' out more time. If my 
homeboy did a crime, and I didn't have no 
part of it, I'd tell now. You know what I'm 
saying, I'd tell now 'cause I ain't doing no 
time ... " 
It must be noted, however, that the threat to the individual 
from gang values is still present. The previous respondent 
continued: 
"But the allegiance is still there to the 
homeboy ... you tell the wrong person, that's 
your life." 
'The big change that came, 
came in 1984. . .. back in 
the old days it was like 
everybody was together, like a 
big old family. Now ever since 
the drugs hit the street, 
everybody wants to go their 
own way, forget about the 
neighborhood ... ' 
Protection from robbery - and its equally important 
corollary of trusting your fellow gang members not to rob 
you- is crucial to the support gangs offer drug dealers. 
But precisely this security is now being called into 
question. Ripoffs between gang members are on the rise. 
In the words of one gang member: 
"The big change that came, came in 1984. 
That's when the drugs started hittin' the 
street, [and] everybody gettin' into it. It's just 
like, back in the old days it was like 
everybody was together, like a big old family. 
Now ever since the drugs hit the street, 
everybody wants to go their own way, forget 
about the neighborhood ... People get a lot of 
money, [and] sometimes the homeboys get 
jealous and stuff ... and sometimes my own 
homeboys take from the homeboys." 
Gang members are also no longer immune from the 
violence which often accompanies robberies, including 
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robberies by fellow gang members. In the words of 
another respondent: 
"It's changed [since 1982] because the dope 
-crack- has got everybody runnin' around 
with their head cut off. Your own homeboy's 
turning against you- shootin' you, killin' 
you for it, for the drugs. Especially the one's 
that's using it. They kill you." 
Gang Migration 
. Against a backdrop of escalating violence, declining drug 
prices, and intensified law enforcement, Los Angeles area 
gang-related drug dealers are seeking out new venues to 
sell the Midas product- crack cocaine. According to 
Frank Storey, head of the FBI's field office in Kansas 
City, Mo., Bloods and Crips "have set up crack operation 
there and in 45 other cities, including Tulsa, Omaha, 
In fact, it appears difficult to 
overstate the penetration of 
Blood and Crip members into 
other states. 
Denver, and St. Louis."14 These operations have also gone 
beyond urban areas. As a recent New York Times 
headline proclaims, "Drug Gangs Are Now Operating in 
Rural States."15 
Our research this summer confirms such reports. 
Respondents claim to have either participated in or have 
knowledge of Blood or Crip crack operations in 22 states 
and at least 27 cities.16 
In fact, it appears difficult to overstate the penetration of 
Blood and Crip members into other states. As one Blood 
respondent put it: 
"They got homeboys ... you know, Crips? .. 
It's got to the point where they're in every 
state now. Nine times out of ten, when I get 
out of town, I know somebody that's out 
there." 
A Crip respondent corroborated this observation: 
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"Everywhere you go, you know what I'm 
saying, anywhere you go, you're gonna see 
some people from L.A. If they got, you know, 
a dope house out there, or a dope street out 
there, you gonna see somebody ... you 'II run 
into somebody on that street from L.A." 
Further, every respondent that belongs to an L.A. area 
Blood or Crip set reports either travelling themselves or 
having knowledge of individuals in his set that do. 
This finding has led us to conclude that travelling or 
going "out of town", as it is commonly referred to by 
gang members, has become an intrinsic part of the 
decisional fabric of the L.A. drug business. That is, just as 
drug dealers decide whether to "curb" sell or "house" sell; 
to have partners or sell alone; or to sell "weight" or just 
rock, they also decide whether to migrate or stay put. 
It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when migration became 
an institutionalized aspect of drug dealing. The recent 
Justice Department report on the expansion of crack 
operations into rural states dates the phenomenon as 
beginning in 1988. Among our respondents, one reports 
having travelled to several states as early as 1981-82, but 
of course, he was selling cocaine as powder. A more 
accurate estimation, based on our interviews, suggests 
that the most ambitious and skilled drug dealers may have 
started as early as 1985, but most didn't begin untill986-
87. 
This development appears to have had a significant 
impact on African-American Los Angeles gangs. 
Travelling to sell drugs is one more indication of the 
transformation of gangs from a 'cultural' orientation to an 
instrumental or entrepreneurial orientation. Or as one 
respondent explained: 
"Back in the earlier days, you know, the 
values of drugs was never overriding the 
values of gangs." 
Why Travel? 
Like an object poised between a closing door and a 
magnet, Los Angeles area gang members experience push 
and pull pressures to abandon the streets of Los Angeles. 
What pushes? Competition is one factor. It is widely 
reported that the Los Angeles area drug market is either 
already saturated or fast becoming so.17 With a reported 
gang membership population of 80,000, it is easy to 
understand why and how competition would reduce crack 
prices in Los Angeles. A respondent describes the 
economic pressure: 
"There's competition, man. Like, say I'm 
selling my ounces for, like seven fifty. Man, 
I'm making a killing. This motherfucker 
comes from L.A., you know what I'm saying, 
with ounces for five fifty. You know what I'm 
saying? And then ... and probably his double 
prices 'blow up dope,' you know what I'm 
saying? B-12's, you know what I'm saying. 
But still, man, they go to buy that shit 'cause 
it's cheaper, you know what I'm saying? Next 
thing you know, everybody ... trying to sell 
at five fifty, I'm going to lower my prices 
down. You know what I'm saying. Or, you 
know, like, I'm giving out a big five 0 sale. 
And my five 0 is big. And he come with a 
bigger five 0 .. So I got to bigger mine, you 
know what I'm saying?" 
One respondent offered an overabundance of supply 
explanation for lower prices: 
"Four ounces gonna cost you on street value 
today, like $2,500. Back then, four ounces 
would cost you like three or four thousand 
dollars. [Why has the price come down?] 
Because it's so easy to get now. It's coming 
in so much large quantity that everybody's 
gettin' it, everybody wantin' to make they 
money, you know." 
There is no doubt that the street price of cocaine in Los 
Angeles declined dramatically between 1988 and 1989. In 
1988, we reported that the price of a kilo of cocaine had 
fallen from $50,000 to $60,000 to $12,000. In the late 
summer of 1989 the price apparently declined to between 
$9,000 and $10,000 per kilogram- this despite 
heightened law enforcement activity at every level of 
government. Price reduction has made drug markets 
outside of Los Angeles much more attractive. As one 
respondent commented: 
"Out of town where nobody else ain't at ... 
that's where the money's being made because 
there's too much competition in Los Angeles. 
It's got too many dope dealers in Los Angeles 
competing against each other. So they take it 
out of town. The profits are better. Here you 
can sell an ounce for $600, over there you can 
sell it for $1,500." 
If competition serves as one of the propelling factors, 
intensified law enforcement is another. When drug selling 
in a neighborhood becomes too extensive and too visible, 
a concentrated police response is often the result. One 
respondent describes gang member perceptions of and 
reaction to a police response: 
"Probably my neighborhood would get hot or 
something like that, you know. The law 
would be death on the neighborhood. They 
just crack down and come like every other 
day .... just make a whole sweep and just take 
everybody to jail. You know all the time you 
look up and see the police. You can't be in 
that neighborhood without the police coming. 
So you go somewhere else." 
"And you go somewhere else and get that one 
hot. Until you just get the whole city hot, once 
you know the whole city is hot ... that the 
police ain't playing, you get out of the city. 
Go to another city. And then bum that city 
out, just like everywhere that's been burnt 
out, that's why people's going out of 
California." 
Of the informants who made this point, all referred to 
either police sweeps or raids upon crack houses as the 
major factor "pushing" them out of town. Whether other 
police tactics, such as undercover buying and police 
presence in a neighborhood, are also effective to the same 
degree is not clear. In sum, both competition and police 
pressure motivate migration. None of our respondents 
suggested, however, that anyone committed to selling 
drugs is about to seek out an honest job. As one 
respondent summarily explained: 
"You get too known, it get too competitive, it 
get too hot ... a lot of police crack down. 
Then again, the people just want to make 
money. They say, "It's too much competition 
here, hey man, let's go out, like to Iowa, Iowa 
and Utah." 
The Pull to Travel 
The pull to travel is best understood as a pursuit of higher 
prices allhough there are other advantages to travelling 
which will be discussed later. Ultimately, the draw is 
simply the flip side of the declining street value of crack 
in Los Angeles. 
"The gangs are gettin' bigger, they gettin', I'd 
say, more sophisticated to selling drugs ... 
They expanding their organization out of 
town. First it was just in the L.A. area and in 
their neighborhood. Now they takin' it out of 
town because there's more money to be made 
there." 
As this respondent suggests, areas adjacent to Los 
Angeles and other cities in California18 generally, early 
experienced the effects of this pursuit of higher prices. 
Two respondents related their experiences in these areas: 
"[Describing condition in 1985] In Lancaster 
you make more money. It is better to go to 
L.A. to buy your drugs and then go to 
Lancaster to sell them." 
"You can charge a lot more, you know, like 
when I went to the San Fern~do Valley, what 
they was charging for $50, you know what 
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I'm saying?, I'd give it to them for $20 [in my 
neighborhood]." 
This condition is now duplicated in out-of-state drug 
markets: 
"I can come out [t]here, you know, cause they 
might sell a twenty dollar rock . . . a twenty-
five dollar rock ... small, real small 
compared to what we might sell out here. We 
might sell it bigger than what they sell it out 
there. We can go out there and double our 
money ... See, the dope out here ... is, like, 
lower ... than the dope out there." 
"You go to Phoenix ... like, with a rock out 
here that I would sell for $25, I'd go to 
Phoenix and make it sell for $50." 
Apart from the higher prices that Los Angeles area gang 
drug dealers can exact from out-of-town markets, they 
maintain four additional advantages when they migrate .. 
1) They can exploit a reputation for violence thus 
diminishing threats from local out-of-town drug dealers 
Two respondents explained the attitude that local dealers 
take towards Los Angeles visitors: 
"Because other cities, they consider L.A. a 
crazy city which it is. You know what I'm 
saying? ... Like Chicago, like cities with 
gangs not like us, they look at us like, 'you 
motherfuckers is crazy', ... you get a lot of 
respect." 
.. they see the news, and they 
think everybody going to come 
out here and shoot them up.' 
"Out there you not going to get into it with 
anybody from L.A., especially South Central 
L.A., because, everybody knows what goes 
on, or they see the news, and they think 
everybody going to come out here and shoot 
them up." 
2) Los Angeles travellers perceive themselves as enjoying 
accesses to more resources- money, firepower and skill 
- than local competitors. Respondents offered the 
following comments regarding this advantage: 
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"We faster than they are, we from the city, 
see. So they would have to watch us first, 
because we knew what we were doing. It's 
like if a business-person were to go to a 
slower town and start up a business putting 
computers in. They had to learn from us." 
"They [local dealers] couldn't do nothing. 
They're too slow. And if there are any of 
them that got heart and that want to stand up . 
.. Well, we got some on our team that are 
straight killers that will kill." 
3) Los Angeles travellers have access to larger quantities 
of cocaine than local dealers. One respondent described 
the out-of-town drug market in the following way: 
"Out there [Minnesota], it's quick to sell, it 
didn't even take us a week [to sell 7 kilos]. 
We sold by the ounce, the quarter key, the 
half key. The dealers from out there started 
buying from us." 
4) Los Angeles travellers have developed more 
sophisticated arrest avoidance techniques than local police 
usually encounter. A respondent gave us an example of 
one technique he used while selling in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. 
"The police was trying, but they couldn't do 
nothing about it [drug sells]. They got some 
police out there called 'nasty boys', they wear 
all black. You can't see them coming unless 
you really look out. So we said, 'yeah, that's a 
slick idea.' So we got to wearing all black so 
they couldn't see us, so they didn't know 
what was going on." 
Stay at Homes 
Despite the compelling inducements and the many 
advantages gang members enjoy when they do migrate, 
many gang members travel only selectively, within 
California, or not at all. Respondents indicated four 
reasons for declining to sell drugs outside Los Angeles: 
1) Foreign Prisons. Respondents discussed the quality of 
prison life. They fear doing time in prisons outside of 
California. In California, gang members already retain 
ties to inmates, while they do not in other venues. As one 
respondent put it 
"I'd mther go to jail here than go to jail way 
up there [in this case, Seattle, Washington]." 
But this fear goes deeper, expressing the danger of being 
in any prison without commdes. The respondent 
continued: 
"They [inmates in other states] arc gonna fuck 
with us ... They've never been to Los 
Angeles County. They got them hinky, hanky, 
mothcrfuckers up there, man. Fucking kill off 
my fucking ass or something, man." 
They fear doing time in prisons 
ouside of California. 
(2) Sentence Severity. Respondents fear that in some 
other states and in the federal system, sentences will be 
higher than they are in California for comparable 
offenses. Some states merited explicit identification. "I'd 
hate to get caught in Texas or Alabama or Mississippi 
with a cocaine charge." 
Others were opposed to travelling regardless of the 
destination: 
"That's dangerous, you're talking about a lot 
of time. And if you just do it in California 
you're cool." 
(3) Distance from Friends and Family. Respondents 
expressed a fear of the unknown, of leaving the security, 
familiarity and recognized relationships of the 
neighborhood. One respondent, discussing others who 
declined to leave the neighborhood, addresses their 
timidity in somewhat disparaging terms: 
"They is addicted to the 'hood, you know 
what I'm saying? They don't want to leave 
home ... move away from the 'hood, you 
know?" 
Other respondents explain their disinclination to travel not 
so much as timidity, but as caution in anticipation of the 
dangers of the unknown; as well as a lack of confidence 
in those who claim to know the dangers of the outlying 
territory: 
"I ain't never been nowhere. I don't believe in 
going out of town. I be thinking something is 
going to happen to me. I just stay in an area 
that I know about." 
"I always wanted to be around my 'hood ... I 
want to know where I can run to. I don't like 
following a motherfucker hoping he knows 
where he is going, I want to know where I'm 
going." 
(4) Satisfaction. Some respondents report that some gang 
members are satisfied with the income derived from 
current drug selling operations in Los Angeles. Almost all 
consider traveling, but don't feel that the pressures 
warrant the risk associated with travel. 
Making the Move 
Whatever the pressures to leave the comfortable environs 
of Los Angeles and strike out to sell in unfamiliar venues, 
travelling usually does not commence following anything 
like a formal meeting and strategic planning by informed 
associates. According to our respondents, all inclinations 
to travel of course begin with the expectation of acquiring 
income, even wealth, from the new local drug trade. But 
these are the travels of provincials, not cosmopolitans. 
The expectation of unaccustomed drug income offers 
many of them their first opportunity to travel outside their 
neighborhood, city, and state. Indeed, the idea of selling 
drugs out of town may be activated from ordinary 
extended family visits to distantly located relatives: 
"A family member probably say something, 
like you know ... 'Drugs is out here' ... they 
got drugs here but it's not a lot of drugs, like 
out there in South Central." 
As the operation expands it usually becomes more 
sophisticated, depending on actual market opportunities, 
plus the skill and ambition of the gang member who 
'discovers' it. Generally, the longer the travelling 
phenomenon continues the more sophisticated it becomes 
as Bloods and Crips begin to develop an extensive 
network of contacts in cities and counties throughout the 
nation. 
Among those who do decide to travel, plans are usually 
made according to the network of the individual planning 
to migrate and the word on the street about the potential 
of a market. That is, most of those who venture out of 
South Central choose a locale either because a trusted 
homeboy is already on the scene or he hears from a 
trusted homeboy that money can be made out there. The 
former mode is illustrated by a respondent who describes 
his introduction as follows: 
"Yes, I had people who was already out there, 
already knew the ropes and shit, you know, 
what's going on, and shit, because if you just 
go out there and you don't know a damn thing 
you'll go to jail quick." 
Three respondents reported that they choose an out-of-
state destination based upon what they had heard on the 
'street'. One of them illustrates the conversation as 
follows: 
" 'Hey, what's been gain' on homeboy? I 
been out here and here .. .' 'what's been 
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goin' on out there?' ' ... There's money out 
there.' 'Where about?' And he tell me ... " 
Or they were recruited to sell drugs for someone else out 
of town: 
"Well my homeboy tell me ... one of my big 
homeys come over there and say, 'Yeah, I just 
got this spot from this, you know, base head. 
You know, we got a spot over there from a 
base head.' So we go over there and make 
money." 
Occasionally, risk accepting homeboys who arc feeling 
the heat or the competition in South Central decide, like 
immigrants seeking a promised land, to venture 
somewhere, anywhere, that seems to promise economic 
opportunity and adventure. One reported that he had been 
selling in Arizona. Did he have connections there? His 
answer: 
"Nah, we just got on the airplane. Paid them 
the money, went out and got on a airplane. 
[You didn't know anybody, have any prior 
information?] Didn't know nothing. Just 
looking for, you know, the dope ... the dope 
smokers, you know." 
Although the homeboys arc in one sense, provincials, in 
another they are sophisticates. They know the culture of, 
and feel comfortable within, the confines of an inner 
city's drug dealing world. If a homeboy has neither 
contacts in a particular city nor information about the 
nature of its drug market, he often understands how to 
scout it out: 
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"We went out there and got our own area. We 
had to peep things out first. There's ways to 
go about it. Got out there, get with some girls 
or something, talk to girls, find out 
information; girls done talk, you know. You 
got to know how to do it." 
"I went like on a scouting mission. Me and 
two other homeboys, check it out. We'd go 
down there with all the flash, you know, my 
big homeboy would have all the dope, all the 
money. He'd get us down there, we'd lease a 
Corvette or Mercedes or something, you 
know, we have all this jewelry and the flashy 
clothes and the loud sound in the car and we'd 
just ride around different high schools. And 
people, say like in Kansas, they see that and 
they like 'Oh man, you know they from LA, 
they from LA, from California' and they 
come to you." 
"You meet [a] girl and you get in good with 
her ... like there's been cases where we met a 
girl, got in good with her, let her hold money 
for you and stuff, let her see how there's 
money ... and then, you know, you're selling 
dope out of her house, or she's selling dope 
for you or she tell you where all the dope 
spots is, you know, she's telling you who's 
who in that town, you know, and then you get 
yourself established. She's glamorized by the 
car, the jewelry, the money, you young, 
beepers, you know, they used to see beepers 
out there and just go nuts." 
Once the expansion decision has been made, the issue 
shifts to the potential hazards posed by illegal drug 
transfer. Few respondents counted occasional 
transportation of drugs across state lines as being 
extraordinarily difficult. But those who transported drugs 
on a regular basis invested considerable thought and 
energy into avoiding capture. One respondent mailed his 
cocaine to a P.O. box or an address, since police were 
using dogs at airports. Others usually drove or flew with 
or near the drugs to the out-of-state locale. Tactics to 
avoid arrest varied. Those who drove to the new venue 
might employ the following: 
"All right, in the car, we had the back scat 
made, so you could pull it out and put the 
drug there ... We pack it in regular plastic, 
then in tinfoil, then in a vacuum-packed bag 
that's supposed to take the smell out, so the 
dog can't smell it." 
"In the Benz, there's this hole, but I put 
powder there. I rock it up when I get there. 
Then I take it in the first aid kit in the Benz, 
put it in the headrest, put powder up there 
where the zipper is. Put it in the door panels." 
Those who flew to new venues employed other tactics. 
"We had it like this: the guys would dress 
ordinary ... like off the street. The police got 
hip to us. So we started dressing good- the 
fancy clothes, the big jewelry - so the police 
would get us and the girls would go through. 
The police would say 'hey, you're drug 
dealers' and hassle us; the girls would dress 
ordinary and get through." 
"That worked for a while, then the police 
started getting hip to it. So we got white girls . 
.. We go up to Hollywood. If the girls liked 
us we'd start talking to them: "Hey, will you 
do us a favor?' ... girls our age ... they'd do 
it ... we'd pay them $500-$600. They'd do it 
for the money." 
"Eventually the rumor was, don't usc the 
airport, they taking everybody's money. So 
we [then] started taking the bus ... I be 
scared to get on the bus, but that's part of the 
risk. She sit up in front, I sit in the back, just 
like that. She get off the bus, get in cab. I 
already gave her the address. She was paid up 
front." 
As the remarks of the above respondent illustrate, an 
elaborate and well conceived transportation plan must be 
developed for most ongoing crack operations. Drugs must 
be dispatched to the new market and proceeds returned to 
Los Angeles. One group of travellers began training their 
runners or couriers: 
"Most likely the runner be a female, an older 
woman, in her thirties. We'd have a woman, 
and she'd have to get trained- I guess you 
would call it trained - we just told her how 
to do it, then she would do it if she wanted to . 
.. We was paying our runner $9,000-$10,000 
a month." 
Through these various methods our respondents were 
transporting as little as an ounce to as much as six to ten 
kilos a month to cities in Nebraska, Missouri and 
Louisiana. 
Once there, crack operations varied in quantity of drugs 
sold, frequency of visits, and nature of selling (e.g. curb 
selling vs. house selling). Typically, Los Angeles area 
gang members will adopt the same selling practices as 
locals. Thus, in Detroit, travellers generally sold out of 
houses, while in Minnesota travellers sold at the curb. 
Eventually, at the high-end, these operations, advantaged 
as they arc by modern communications technology, can 
become quite sophisticated. As this occurs, they come 
more closely to resemble the organized crime model. One 
advanced drug entrepreneur describes his operation as 
follows: 
"Every house I ever had I [went] about it in 
the same way ... I hire anybody- Bloods, 
Crips, Hispanics ... I had different people in 
different spots ... What I used to do, I used to 
just kick back and ride around, spend time 
with my wife and kids. I got a beeper, okay, 
you know, with a beeper service. I got a 
beeper that's, you can be in Cleveland and get 
beeped from out here [Los Angeles]. It's what 
you call 'round the world' beeper, one for LA, 
one for all around. So ... if I had to go do 
something - pick up some money or 
something, or take someone stuff out there-
they'd just call." 
In one gang, members had established out of town spots 
in five cities. They then began pooling their money 
together: 
"All the homeboys put all their dope together, 
and send it like that; then all the money come 
back and then it's how much everybody 
should get ... " 
Operations such as this are well-organized, low profile, 
and if possible, non-violent. These characteristics, 
exhibited among high level dealers are also manifested 
among more casual travellers. In particular, efforts to 
maintain peace with other Los Angeles gangs and local 
drug dealers, and low profiles with regard to law 
enforcement agencies are shared by all travellers, 
irrespective of their ambition and sophistication. 
Taken together, these characteristics may represent the 
'New Rules of Drug Dealing.' In sharp contrast to the 
rules prevailing in Los Angeles, Bloods and Crips arc not 
interested in gang banging with one another or with locals 
when they are out of town. 
"As for that Crip and Blood thing, that's not 
going on outside of town." 
"Everybody trying to keep a low profile. 
Everybody like, 'there's enough out here for 
everybody. Just don't step on nobody's toes'. 
We never got into it. It's all about money; 
money come first. You can gang bang 
anytime." 
Indeed, gang members will leave a locale rather than risk 
conflict with another set, even a rival. 
"If we go to Louisiana, another set can come 
to Louisiana, but they can't come to the city 
we at, they have to go to another city, they 
have to be far away from us ... If you go out 
of town, and you a Crip set and there another 
Crip set, then you have to move out; that's 
respect. If we go out to a state and there's 
Bloods out there, then we choose if we want 
to leave or not. But most likely we'll leave 
because we don't want to be shooting a fight 
with no others, in no different state, because 
we out there to do one thing: make money ... 
We're out there to sell drugs not for the 
killing." 
These instrumental values implicit in the "new rules of 
drug dealing" are not easily apparent to younger gang 
members, who are used to the traditional Los Angeles 
gang rules. They, in effect, need to be resocialized to 
understand and conform with the emerging 
entrepreneurial goals of distant markets. 
13 
"But sec out there you got these 16 and 17-
year olds want a name for themselves ... 
Some of them that went out there with me 
want to know 'where the Bloods at? Where 
the slimes at? Let's go get off on them.' I 
said, 'I'm not goin' nowhere, I'm not showing 
you how to get around out here ... I ... care 
because it bring the heat on me if they do 
something outside a one of my houses." 
In some instances, gang members do not merely avoid 
inter-gang fighting, but report active cooperation. 
"Sec like Chick (a Blood), he was calling the 
shots out there (Minnesota), with the Crips 
too. I ain't going to lie, he was like calling the 
shots, but we had like our own little section 
and shit. We stayed out they way, they stay 
out our way. They apartment was next door, 
right next door, to us and shit, you know, ... 
They stayed in they little corner and we 
stayed in ours, we stayed out their way." 
The same deference that Los Angeles gangs display 
towards one another also applies to locals, provided the 
local dealers don't attempt to resist Blood and Crip 
intrusions in the drug market. 
"Once we get outside of town we not thinking 
about trying to kill one another. Everybody 
trying to have money. Once we get out of 
town that's the thing- we got to be together. 
In an environment we don't know nothing 
about. What about these local assholes, we 
got to watch out for these assholes, we don't 
know about them ... But then again, all we 
got to do is find one dude from that area, and 
we get to know him and he put us up on a lot 
of things on that area." 
"We didn't came up there to fuck with no 
gangs or nothing. We came out there to make 
our money to get on about our biz, we ain't 
come out there [to gangbang] because that's 
how a bunch of shit gets started. You go out 
there with a gangbanging attitude, you won't 
never have shit. You 'II get killed ... " 
This more purposively rational attitude also applies to 
avoiding notice and identification by the police; Los 
Angeles gang members will alter their dress when out of 
town in an effort to be less conspicuous. 
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"We don't go out there all ganged ... We, 
like, wear casual, like, corduroys, you know, 
little T-shirt or some little hat, you know, and 
that's it." 
Dealers make efforts to avoid police and especially to 
avoid areas which have a reputation of stiff law 
enforcement and sentencing. 
"People don't want to go to Texas, because I 
heard when you go to Texas, you hang ... 
You really won't catch anybody that will go 
down, down South, because if you get caught 
here you will only spend time." 
"They wanted to go to L0uisiana, I was, like, 
'you crazy.' Won't get me to go to no shit like 
that man. That's real man. That's the way I 
see it." 
These "new rules", however, are or will be challenged by 
several developments. These developments arc: the 
saturation of out-of-town markets, imitation of Los 
Angeles gang structure by youth in out-of-town drug 
markets, and increased law enforcement effectiveness as 
locales begin to share information and techniques to 
combat gang migration~ 
Perhaps foremost of these developments is a perception of 
tightening of competition in out-of-town markets. 
Whether this is attributable primarily to an increase in 
supply -or to a reduction in demand- is difficult to 
estimate. In any event, one respondent reported: 
"I went to all of them [Cleveland, Kansas 
City, Tacoma, Las Vegas, Indianapolis, 
Milwaukee, Alaska, and Texas] ... I was 
making a lot of money, but it got to the point 
where, the dope dealer call it 'this body 
gettin' burnt out'. Right? There's too many 
people out there, you know. And the one's 
[customers] that's coming to you ain't comin' 
to you no more. The money that was comin' 
to you ain't comin' to you no more. It's still 
there but you got to be patient to get it." 
The possibility of renewed hostility grows as out-of-town 
markets tighten. These are unstable markets serviced by 
young men who know how to respond violently in 
situations where they perceive challenge or "disrespect." 
One respondent offered the following observation on how 
easily gang hostilities can begin. 
"When I go out into another state and shit, I 
let the niggas know right here I'm from 
Compton because I got tattoos all over me, so 
it ain't shit I can hide, So I tell them you 
know, 'I'm from Compton Crip man, I ain't 
coming out here to disrespect you, you all just 
giving me my respect' ... I ain't going to say 
'fuck you all set' because I don't want them 
to say that to me and shit. But if they say that 
shit, you know it could start a gangbang. All I 
do is make one phone call, call my cuz, call 
some of the homeboys, they'll come out and 
see what's going down. Then the gang shit 
starts." 
In terms of duplication, we can only speculate on the 
probability of mass proliferation of gang formation and 
identification. One respondent related the following 
incident to us about the reaction of local youth to his 
presence in their neighborhood. 
"They was young and shit, you know, they 
wanted to be in a gang. I used to try and tell 
them ... man it's too late to join [a] gang, that 
shit is old now. They still don't want to listen 
to me, so I said 'fuck, all you got to do is go 
fuck that nigga up and shit and you're in the 
'hood.'" 
Gang Organization and Migration Patterns 
The willingness to assume risk is not the primary 
difference between Northern (entrepreneurial) and 
Southern California (cultural) "gang" related crack selling 
operations. And as Bruce Johnson et. al., have pointed out 
"inner-city minority youths working in the illicit cocaine 
economy are selling their labor, sales skills, and 
willingness to risk very substantial prison penalties. The 
willingness to take such risk is the only service which 
middle class persons value and pay for [when buying 
drugs]."t9 
A more important distinction is in organizational 
structure. The Los Angeles cultural gang is horizontally 
organized while the Northern California is vertically 
organized. The only purpose of Northern California 
"gangs" is to facilitate profitable criminal activity. The 
distinctive features of these gangs are: 1) members 
consider them a business organization; 2) the business is 
drug dealing; and 3) as a consequence, the use of violence 
is limited to intentional and directed towards protection or 
promotion of business interests. 
In addition, we observed the structure of such 
organizations to be vertical. There are three elements of 
vertically organized crack operations. 
First, one person usually controls the supply of drugs to a 
turf. As one respondent put it: "There's always a big man 
somewhere around. As far as being in a dope gang, 
there's always a big man." Several respondents referred to 
specific turfs as being run by one or a small group of 
individuals. One respondent reported playing such a role 
in his turf: 
"I was passed the torch from my brothers, as 
far as leadership. I have some O.G. (Original 
Gangsters) homeboys, but they in jail. 
Everybody in Hunter's Point (San Francisco) 
pretty much listens to me. I had that respect 
coming to me from my brothers, and I had it 
coming to where I could say 'we goin' do 
this, that.' " 
Second, this person determines who can sell drugs in a 
turf, that is, he determines in an organizational sense, 
membership. According to one respondent: 
"The whole Acorn (in Oakland) don't get 
along. Now it's different. [When] Larry P. 
was running the whole Acorn, we didn't fuck 
with him. Larry P. was like 'Man, tell your 
fool, I catch you down here, you or any of 
your boys down here selling some more dope, 
fool, and it ain't any of mine, I'm going to 
break arms or whatever.'" 
And third, within the organization, several roles are 
created and filled on the basis of age and expertise. One 
respondent described his introduction and matriculation 
through an organization. 
"Around ten, that's when they started liking 
me, hooking me up. I keep their dope on me 
when the police come and shit like that. 
Gradually I got hooked up and I started 
selling dope for them, my older partners, my 
OGs. And then I grows up and my little 
partners, they look up to me. They started 
getting hooked up with me. And it goes on 
and on like that." 
While the above sounds relatively efficient, the vertical 
structure of most crack operations generates competition 
within the organization. There are only a limited number 
of "spots" at each level of the organization. As a 
consequence, distrust, betrayal, and sometimes violence 
occurs among members. 
"In Oakland ... , when you in the dope game 
you can'treally trust nobody, you can't trust 
nobody; even you motherfucking brother ... I 
started feeling I couldn't trust him [his father] 
and he couldn't trust me. Even though he was 
my father, we was blood. Then came the point 
when I was getting so big on my turf and he 
was hearing about it and I was crossing so 
many of his partners that he had people come 
and jump me. So you really can't trust nobody 
in the dope game." 
One respondent reported ripping off fellow turf members 
to rise up. In general it seems a truism that "The next man 
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is try in' to come up off the next man." Indeed, one 
respondent reported: 
"I didn't want to get that high up. I done seen 
too many folks be called big dope dealers, 
die. They feel like they kill him, they can 
move up. It's tight to get up there. You need 
to do a lot of stepping to get up there." 
This intra-turf competition poses serious problems for 
those in leadership. Typically, two methods are employed 
to maintain the leader's authority. The first involves the 
provisioning of rewards for members, such as drugs, 
· luxury items, or clientele. As pointed out in our previous 
report, "the fealty of membership depends on the 
opportunities offered by leaders, usually those who can 
claim a reliable connection to a source of drugs. ''20 
Members are also rewarded with clientele. According to 
one respondent, "My big partners, they be tellin', like 
'yea, we want you all to go to such and so house.' They 
be givin' us their clientele so we could come up." 
At the other end of the spectrum, authority is maintained 
by physical coercion, which in extreme cases may result 
in deadly violence. One respondent who "employed" 30 
or so people described how he maintained fealty. 
"They [his little partners] be trying to come 
up for themself. But we didn't play it like 
that You worked for me or you didn't work 
for nobody. You get caught buying some 
dope, you better buy it from me. They were 
like sneaky little motherfuckers though. They 
make their little money and then they go buy 
like two ounces from somebody else, while I 
get another count." 
"[What would happen if you caught them?] 
They get fucked up. They ain't going to get 
killed, but they'll get beat up. Take their car, 
take their jewelry, slap their bitch in the face, 
spit on them. 'Get on fool, why don't you get 
with another group. You can be as dead as 
they are.' They like 'that's okay man.' They 
be scared to leave.'' 
In sum, vertically organized crack operations generate 
intra-turf competition, which sometimes results in 
violence. This occurs both as low-level dealers attempt to 
displace higher level ones, and horizontally, as "the next 
man tries to come up off the next man.'' 
This competitive attitude extends to rival crack selling 
operations and is the primary cause of violence. As our 
respondents reported: 
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"[We] fight over money, turf.'' 
"There's violence in a way, because some 
people, they have little spots. 'Only my 
people sell here, you'all can't sell here.'" 
"Gangbanging for the people of the Bay Area 
isn't really like Los Angeles- it's a little turf 
dispute. What we're fightin' over is money 
and power ... I wouldn't say it's 
gang banging." 
As we reported in our earlier research, "the frequency of 
instrumental gang violence depends on territorial 
stability. "21 One respondent described what occurs when 
territorial stability is compromised: 
"That's when it really started gettin' deep. 
They were coming by, driving by and 
shooting and so were we. That started 
because, you could say, at the time, and now 
at the present, Hunter's Point is fightin' for 
control of the drug game in San Francisco. 
Fillmore was like wasn't goin' for it. They 
didn't want this to happen because, if it was 
to happen Fillmore wouldn't be making that 
much money. That's why it's still pretty much 
the same as far as the drive-by shooting and 
all the killings. It's because Hunter's Point 
almost got control of the drug trade in San 
Francisco." 
According to another respondent, what is at stake in turf 
wars is who gets most of the money. This respondent, 
after detailing how the Fillmore turf took over the 
Sunnydale turf, asserted that Sunnydale dealers were still 
making money, but "they were selling dope for the next 
man." 
The picture of Northern California crack selling 
operations outlined above may be summarized as 
business-like, hierarchal, and dependent upon the liberal 
use of coercive mechanisms against both internal and 
external competitors. 
By contrasting this state of affairs in Southern California 
we will be able to see the distinctive effect that cultural 
gang organization has upon the structure of crack selling 
operations. This effect helps to explain why Southern 
California drug dealers migrate and Northern California 
drug dealers do not. As the cultural features of Southern 
California gangs persist, so, likely, will migration.22 
Southern California Gangs: The Horizontal 
Structure Explored 
Northern and Southern California "gangs" do not deal 
drugs differently. Both employ curb and house selling 
techniques to distribute their product. Both rely on 
violence to protect their "market share" and guard against 
rip-offs from desperate crack users. However, the 
attitudes and behaviors that Southern California drug 
dealers hold towards members of their own gangs are 
markedly different than those of their Northern California 
counterparts. 
Southern California gangs instill in members trust, 
loyalty, and identity. In many ways they serve to create 
whole individuals and thus play an important role in the 
lives of members regardless of whether they sell drugs or 
even actively remain in the gang. Many respondents 
described what the gang gave them: 
"Well a gang, it like gives you something, it 
gives you something on the inside. You feel, 
when you join a gang, you feel like 
somebody. Especially in South Central, 
people feel like if you not a movie star or a 
professional sports player, you not nothing. 
And it's too hard to start a business, like 
Famous Amos or somebody. If you not a 
movie star or something like that, you not 
nothing. So a gang, it like gives you 
something. You hanging out with the fellas; 
you accepted; you somebody- it gives you 
something on the inside." 
"It's like a family to me, they like brothers. 
The attention, the name, the glory. To escape 
reality from my family ... to seek adventure. 
.. to find something different in life." 
"[Why do people join gangs?] Just to be in, 
you know what I'm saying ... just to be part 
of something." 
Further, drug dealing within the gang is optional. 
According to our respondents; 
"[Gangs] didn't have nothing to do with 
selling no drugs. That's just something you do 
on your own. You straight gang bang. You 
ain't got to get into the drug deal, you know." 
"They say it's peer pressure to get in a gang. 
It ain't peer pressure to get in no gang. It ain't 
peer pressure to sell no drugs either. If you 
decide you gonna sell drugs, you gonna sell 
drugs." 
Finally, Southern California gangs don't have leaders. 
"There's never a leader ... A gang, you 
know, is just a group of people. They just 
hang together and nobody tell nobody what to 
do." 
"There's not really one designated leader. 
You just all together. If a person has an idea, 
or suggestion, then we look into it. Follow 
through with it. But there's not a designated 
leader." 
"There was no one person that called the 
shots on everybody. But there were several of 
my homeboys that was older than us that 
usually set the pace for us." 
The implication of course, is that the structure of the gang 
is more horizontal. People still "come up" in the drug 
trade and within the gang, but this occurs not as a 
consequence of competition with other members, but with 
age, experience, and knowledge. 
Conclusion: A Theory of Gangs and 
Gang Migration 
Although gang migration has attracted governmenf3 and 
media24 attention, it still remains opaque. One explanation 
is that the desire for greater or renewed profits motivates 
dealers to travel to other states. This presupposes a 
transfer of drugs from "old markets" (i.e., Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, New York, Miami, Philadelphia) to "new 
markets" (i.e., Seattle, Phoenix, Kansas City, St. Louis, 
Tennessee). While probably correct, this line of reasoning 
doesn't answer why do some "old markets" generate gang 
migration and others don't? 
Nor does an explanation grounded in the skill and focus 
of law enforcement. That line of argument implies that 
Los Angeles police are more effective than those in San 
Francisco and Oakland and the target cities; and that New 
York and Miami police treat Jamaicans differently than 
indigenous African Americans. There is little evidence to 
suggest that is the case. Police in all cities we have 
studied have evolved and are developing a variety of 
sophisticated enforcement structures -buy-bust teams, 
neighborhood police units, tactical units, undercover units 
-to address drug selling. Gangs everywhere try to avoid 
police apprehension. 
Arrests for selling crack have increased dramatically in 
New York City, from 3,000 per month in 1986 to 6,000 
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per month in the fall of 1988.25 Similar figures can be 
found in Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, Kansas City 
and Seattle. Street drug sellers experience law 
enforcement pressure all over the country. 
As the rise in arrests and enhanced police activity was 
occurring, the price of cocaine was perceptively dropping 
in all of these cities. According to Terry Williams, the 
price of a kilo in New York fell from $60,000 in 1980 to 
$20,000 in 1988.26 A similar price decline is chartable in 
San Francisco where a kilo sold in 1989 for $12-$13,000. 
So street sellers also experience market pressures. All of 
tJ,ese- the increased number of drug dealers and the 
increased supply, the decline in price, the pressure of law 
enforcement- all serve to encourage travelling to "new 
markets." 
At the same time, migration seems to occur mainly among 
Jamaican, Haitian, Dominican and African-American 
street gangs in Los Angeles.27 And only Jamaicans and 
Southern California gangs apparently travel regularly to 
the midwestern United States. Both the Dominican and 
Haitian operations appear to be regional, albeit large 
markets. Why should that be? 
We conclude that the cultural and structural organization 
of gangs, rather than law enforcement or market 
pressures, offers the most compelling explanation of why 
members of some gangs migrate while others do not. Los 
Angeles crack selling operations appear to be horizontally 
organized (although this may be changing). San Francisco 
gangs, on the other hand, are vertically organized. And 
according to Williams and Johnson, New York's crack 
operations are also vertically organized. 
These two different stmctures of crack dealing express 
conspicuously different values- one promoting trust and 
loyalty among equals, the other promoting competition 
and deadly ambition within a local hierarchical structure. 
Horizontally organized cultural gang structures, we 
conclude, furnish the individual gang member with 
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resources - access to source of drugs, confidence, belief, 
courage, attitudes toward risk - all of which facilitate 
venturing into new marketing territories. 
As Southern California gangs move into new territories 
their adventuresome and entrepreneurial members 
implicitly recognize that their operations do not permit the 
continuation of the cultural gang values so familiar to 
them in Los Angeles. South Central remains the base, the 
home territory, and its values cannot be routinely 
transported along with drugs. Likely, that is because the 
gang was not initially organized to sell drugs. Still, those 
values and understandings offer support. Thus, the data 
from our interviews suggest that symbolic values implicit 
in the "cultural" gang support drug marketing migration 
while, paradoxically, "purposive-rational" entrepreneurial 
values do not. 
Neither the Northern nor Southern California gangs are 
comparable to the La Cosa Nostra. If we compare these 
drug selling gangs to the "mafia" we see similarities and 
differences. By identifying itself as La Cosa Nostra (our 
thing) the Mafia generates and attempts to enforce 
symbolic interactionist norms of identity and loyalty, 
while at the same time implementing a vertical table of 
organizational authority. But these gangs, depending on 
whether Northern or Southern, enjoy either cultural 
resources or vertical organization, not both. 
Is it likely that they will evolve into Mafia-like 
organizations? The Northern California gangs do not 
seem to incorporate the cultural grounding for that kind of 
development. And the Southern California gangs seem to 
rest on norms of horizontal organization which would be 
difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, an innovative 
Southern California leader might understand how drug 
selling has undermined some of the gang's normative 
base, but not so much as to make it inoperative. Such a 
person might figure out how to combine the cultural 
grounding of the gang, with the efficiency potential of 
vertical organization. Should that happen, a Mafia-like 
organization might develop in Southern California. 
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DRUGS, GANGS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Illegal drug trafficking is unquestionably the criminal 
justice system's highest priority and most intractable 
problem. From a practical perspective, traditional criminal 
law concerns- degrees of homicide, robbery, theft, 
fraud, justification and excuse - the nuts and bolts of the 
common law and courses in criminal law, pale by 
comparison. 
What is the connection between crime and drugs? There 
is of course a tautological link. Violations of the drug 
laws are themselves crimes. In 1983, around 20 percent of 
felony arrests in California were for drug law violations. 
By 1988, that figure had risen to 30 percent.1 But there is 
more than a tautological connection. A 1989 National 
Institute of Justice's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) study 
found that surprisingly large percentages of persons 
arrested for serious street crimes test positive for drugs. In 
New York and Chicago 78 percent and in San Diego 80 
percent of those arrested for burglary, larceny and assault 
were found to have ingested illicit drugs in the previous 
48 hours.2 
These statistics are consistent with the findings from other 
data bases. Thus, the California Legislative Analyst's 
Report on lhe 1990-91 Budget, after analyzing National 
Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) Household Survey data, 
the California Department of Alcohol and Drug 
Program's (DADP) estimate of problem drug use; the 
Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) data as well as 
DUF and the California Drug Abuse Data System (CAL-
DADS) concludes that the drug using population 
comprises two distinct groups- "casual users whose 
numbers have been decreasing and heavy users whose 
numbers have been increasing. "3 
The DUF data show that street criminals are among the 
heavy users of drugs. It does not follow, however, that 
most drug users commit street crimes. That inference 
would of course be illogical. It would be similar to 
inferring falsely that most alcohol users are reckless 
drivers from a finding that most reckless drivers were 
under the influence of alcohol. 
The correlation between drugs and criminality raises more 
questions than it answers: Do career street criminals 
commit crimes to satisfy an addiction? Do others commit 
crimes because they arc under the influence of a powerful 
drug? Or are drugs a recreational activity popular among 
people who commit street crimes? And does it much 
matter? I suggest it docs from both a jurisprudential and 
social policy perspective. If drugs are regarded by street 
criminals as just another expensive commodity -like 
furs or leather jackets- then whatever punishments we 
impose on other criminals should apply equally to those 
who use drugs. 
But if street crimes are being committed largely to finance 
an addiction, or in reaction to the drugs effects, then 
lengthy prison terms make little moral or practical sense. 
Those who arc addicted will be disposed to commit illegal 
acts to satisfy a craving for the drug. Moreover, to the 
extent that addiction limits freedom of choice, addicts 
may be less deserving of punishment. 
Given the extraordinary relationship between drugs and 
street crime, it is hard to believe that drug addiction docs 
not play a major causal role in motivating such 
criminality. One scholar, after reviewing the quantiL:'ltivc 
information produced by government agencies, clinicians 
and medical researchers, concludes that the majority of 
cocaine users consume only sporadically, while addicts 
generate the greatest individual and collective demand.4 
This perception is supported by NIJ/DUF interviews 
where arrestees are asked if they need drug or alcohol 
treatment and to specify the type of treatment needed. The 
percentages who request treatment vary from city to city, 
from a high of 41 percent in Philadelphia to a low of 11 
percent in Houston. Most of these requests are for cocaine 
treatment, although in five of the 16 cities, more than one-
third of those requesting treatment said they were hooked 
on hcroin.5 
Criminal justice statistics also suggest that addicts rather 
than casual users of drugs arc those who are committing 
crime. Contrary to the popular impressions presented by 
the media, criminal justice statistics show a decline in 
victim crime such as robbery and burglary since 1980. In 
1980, the U.S. robbery rate per 100,000 was 251. By 1987 
it had dropped to 213. The burglary rate was 1 ,684. In 
1987, it dropped to 1,330.6 Since reported robberies and 
burglaries seem to be declining; and since most of those 
arrested for those crimes arc drug ingesters - but by no 
means most of the drug ingcsters - it seems reasonable 
to assume that drug addiction rather than use is a major 
cause of crime. 
What is the relation between heavy cocaine use and 
trafficking? Arc these largely overlapping populations or 
arc they separate? Our seller interviews suggest that, 
unlike heroin sellers of an earlier time, they are largely 
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separate populations; that is, those who sell drugs are 
mainly illegal entrepreneurs who are selling not to 
maintain a habit, but to earn money. For them, the 
opportunity to market the drug is valued highly, so highly 
that they will fight and even kill to maintain market 
control. As a result, drug trafficking has become 
increasingly associated with both street violence and the 
decline of neighborhood civility.7 
r:inally, the prevalence of drug selling, itself a felony in 
every jurisdiction in the United States, surely undermines 
the accuracy of estimates of the amount of felonious 
crime in this country. Criminologists have traditionally 
identified two sources of error in crime statistics. One, the 
so-called "dark figure" of crime, addresses the limitations 
of the Uniform Crime Reports and refers to crimes 
undisclosed to police. Since many victimizations are not 
divulged to the police, these statistics, gathered in the 
Uniform Crime Reporting System, substantially 
underestimate the kind and amount of criminal 
victimization. The National Crime Survey attempts to 
correct for this distortion by asking people to report their 
victimizations to survey researchers rather than the police. 
Crimes which arc undcrrcportcd to the survey researchers 
arc sometimes said to constitute the "double dark" figure 
of crime.8 
There is also, however, a "triple dark" figure involving 
consensual but felonious crime. At the white-collar level, 
this may include bribes and kickbacks. Still, drug sales 
must far outnumber these, and by how much we can only 
guess. The triple dark figure of crime may be our most 
elusive crime statistic. Its magnitude can only be 
suggested indirectly by the huge amounts of illegal drugs 
confiscated by law enforcement authorities9 and the 
complaints of local citizens complaining and reporting a 
sharp rise in neighborhood drug selling. 
In sum, ailhough burglaries and robberies appear to have 
declined in the past decade the public has not become less 
concerned about crime. Why not? Obviously, it is because 
both the actual and perceived violence associated with 
drugs and gangs has become a major area of public 
concern. As reports of gang migration from Los Angeles 
to other cities become increasingly evident during 1989, 
communities outside of Los Angeles became increasingly 
concerned about the invasion. It seemed worthwhile to 
study law enforcement responses to gangs and their role 
in the drug dealing picture. 
Police Strategies 
In 1989, I spent two weeks in Kansas City and 
approximately one week in Seattle, Los Angeles and New 
York interviewing and where possible participant 
observing with police and prosecutors. Police officials in 
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all of these cities reported that drug distribution was their 
principal criminal justice problem, although in Los 
Angeles the gangs themselves, and inter-gang violence, 
constituted an independent public safety problem. Two of 
the cities, Kansas City and Seattle, had experienced a 
significant "gang" migration problem and were therefore 
selected as sites to observe. 
Neither city's police force could claim a "solution" to 
eradicating drug dealing from their cities, although each 
was able to increase arrests and to apply pressure to drug 
dealers. I observed in Los Angeles because it is the locus 
of the migrating gang members; and New York- which 
had not been invaded by West Coast gangs. In all of these 
cities, police were actively struggling to counter the drug 
problem with a variety of tactical approaches. In what 
follows, I shall report on my observations and interviews 
with police in each of the cities, although I shall focus 
mainly on Kansas City and Seattle, since these were the 
principal responders to the Los Angeles gangs outside of 
Los Angeles. I shall try to summarize the most innovative 
features of these approaches and then discuss the 
structural conditions - beyond the control of police and 
prosecutors- which limit the effectiveness of drug law 
enforcement in controlling drug trafficking. 
The Problem 
In his 1988 Annual Report, Kansas City Chief Larry 
Joiner points to "the increase of violent crimes associated 
with the influx and use of crack cocaine" as the major 
crime problem facing the Kansas City Police Department. 
This increase in drug trafficking is attributed to "a new 
challenge for the department- the infiltration of Los 
Angeles gangs." As in other cities, Kansas City employs a 
variety of drug enforcement tactics which I observed 
during my two visits over ten days. These included buy 
bust operations, observation arrcsLs, warrants served on 
crack houses by a full-time team and specialists in 
community involvement. But because I was considering 
drug enforcement tactics directed specifically toward Los 
Angeles based gangs, in this part of the report on Kansas 
City, I shall limit my discussion to the apprehension and 
federal prosecution of these gang members. A similar 
federal - local strategy is also occurring in Seattle. 
The migration of Crips and Bloods to Kansas City should 
largely be understood as a displacement-replacement 
phenomenon. About three years earlier, in 1985 and 1986, 
30 or 40 Jamaican drug dealers arrived in Kansas City and 
successfully introduced crack cocaine. The Jamaican 
cocaine connections were from south Florida and the 
Jamaican dealers were able to deliver a steady supply of 
the drug. The Jamaicans controlled the crack trade at 
every level and were reputedly very violcnt. 10 
In response to the influx of the Jamaicans, the Kansas 
City Police Department set up a special narcotics 
enforcement unit with the Federal Government in which 
the local officers were deputized as Federal agents. This 
unit was able to convict 23 Jamaicans of serious drug 
offenses. 
The Jamaicans were sentenced under Federal law to long 
sentences- 10, 15, 25 year sentences·- with no bail. 
Chief Joiner, among others, stresses that the no bail 
provision acted as a major deterrent to the Jamaicans. 
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 USCA par. 3142) 
bail may be denied when there is a serious risk that the 
accused will flee; or will threaten or intimidate potential 
witnesses; or will be a danger to the community. 
Since the Jamaicans were reputedly violent, were 
financially well-to-do, and had a place outside the U.S. to 
flee to, it was not difficult for the Federal prosecutors to 
persuade the Federal judges to deny bail. As a result, 
whenever a Jamaican drug dealer was charged, and later 
convicted, he remained in custody from the time of the 
arrest; and, once convicted, was imprisoned for lengthy 
terms. According to the local police, Kansas City came to 
be known among the Jamaican drug dealers as a "Black 
Hole," because once arrested and convicted, a dealer 
would not see the street again for long years. As a result, 
the flow of Jamaicans to Kansas City was substantially 
reduced or stopped; or they were far more circumspect in 
their dealings and especially in their violence. After the 
convictions, there were few, if any identifiable Jamaican 
homicides. But the relative absence of Jamaicans did not 
result in the end of drug commerce in Kansas City. In the 
summer of 1989, the Department's Jamaican specialist 
believed that Jamaicans were distributing drugs in Kansas 
City, but from a much lower profile. The vacuum left by 
the Jamaicans was filled by Crips and Bloods. 
Kansas City, of course, is in the Midwest, and its non-
indigenous drugs must be supplied from some other place, 
either from Florida or New York or Los Angeles, some 
other place in the United States where drugs are imported, 
processed and sold. In 1989, the narcotics officers I 
interviewed estimated that the majority of the crack 
cocaine in Kansas City - perhaps 60 to 70 percent -
originated in Los Angeles. This is of course only a guess. 
As with the triple dark of crime, the amounts brought in 
and the source of the cocaine traffic can only be 
estimated. 
Why did Los Angeles gang members migrate to Kansas 
City? The explanations offered by the gang members we 
interviewed in prison and the Kansas City narcotics police 
were entirely consistent. Kansas City was not selected as 
the result of a strategic decision or a marketing survey. 
Although drug distribution demands a degree of 
organization- surely a legal "conspiracy"- it is not 
that well organized. The Crips and Bloods who migrated 
to Kansas City operated in a world of kin organization 
rather than an overarching criminal organization. Those 
who migrated had friends or relatives, informal social 
connections in both cities. 
Major David Barton, Kansas City's narcotics chief, 
described one convicted drug dealer as typifying the 
pattern. When "Jones" had been in the Marine Corps, he 
had been stationed near his LA relatives, with whom he 
became increasingly friendly. He adopted the LA 
lifestyle, had a cousin- "Brown"- who was an 
original gangster. They, but not the "gang," recognized 
the potential for profit in the Kansas City market - that 
they could sell drugs in Kansas City for at least twice the 
price of what comparable drugs might sell for in Los 
Angeles. 
"Jones" and "Brown" were typical in another sense. One 
was a former Marine, the other an original gangster. 
These are not youthful gangbangers. The Crips and 
Bloods who transport drugs from Los Angeles are people 
who are older than the typical gang member. They are 
young men in their 20's who have survived gang-banging, 
who arc original gangsters, quite savvy and experienced 
in criminal activities and in dealing with and usually 
avoiding the police. 
When they first arrived, they and their gang associates 
exhibited their colors, and graffiti appeared in various 
neighborhoods. The police believed that this was a 
strategic move, an effort to mobilize local youngsters 
impressed with the aura of the Los Angeles gang. It was, 
in a sense, a way of expanding the values and loyalties 
prevailing in the Los Angeles gangs to Kansas City. 
But the tactic partly backfired. When drug dealers wear 
gang colors or use graffiti, they bring unwanted police 
attention to themselves. Rational drug dealers try to 
deflect police attention and so the show of gang symbols 
has diminished. Nevertheless, graffiti do appear and kids 
who sells drugs on the street do sometimes call 
themselves Crips and Bloods. But these are usually not 
California kids. They are Kansas City youngsters, "wanna 
bees" who are using these symbols as a way of marking 
out their turf and of showing some identity with Los 
Angeles gangs. 
At the same time, the actual Crips and Bloods supply 
Kansas City with a regular supply of drugs. In Kansas 
City, the Crips and Bloods are generally inconspicuous, 
very quiet. When they are arrested, their original domicile 
is traceable through their social security number, which 
identifies region of issuance. Occasionally, but rarely, a 
California Crip or Blood will sell drugs on the Kansas 
City strceL<>. 
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Police do not discern a pattern to all of this. As one of 
them said, "When they leave California, they're either 
tired or maybe they're fearful of being killed in LA, or 
they just come out freelancing. We've seen graffiti from 
the 69th Street Crips and the Inglewood Family Gangsters 
in Kansas City, but it doesn't mean all that much." At the 
same time, the title of Crip or Blood is said to enjoy a 
positive association among Kansas City street drug 
dealers. The Crips and the Bloods arc known to be 
capable of murder. That association and that reputation 
intimidates potential competitors. 
Law Enforcement 
Certain key features of police work and of prosecution 
involved in apprehending and convicting interstate drug 
dealers are worth stressing: (1) that these Crips and Blood 
cases- as well as other cases involving middle and 
upper level dealers - required infiltration by undercover 
police of what is usually a conspiracy; (2) that every drug 
offense is potentially a Federal case. Because these cases 
involved interstate shipments of substantial amounts of 
cocaine (the largest seizure was ten kilos) the cases were 
considered appropriate for Federal jurisdiction; and (3) 
Federal drug, sentencing, and bail statutes are highly 
disadvantageous to defendants in drug cases and are not 
necessarily "typical" of drug enforcement in Kansas City 
~tnd (4) that the mechanism for Federal- local policing 
was initiated in response to Jamaican gangs including 
persons identifying themselves as Muslims as well as 
Crips and Bloods. 
So the challenge of the Los Angeles gangs was responded 
to by developing increasingly cooperative investigations 
between the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Kansas City 
Police Department, headed by Major David M. Barton 
and various federal agencies, and coordinated by the 
United States Attorney in the Western District of 
Missouri, particularly Assistant U.S. Attorneys Linda 
Parker and Peter Ossorio. As a result of these 
investigations, 26 cases involving Crips and Bloods gang 
members had been submitted as of May 24, 1989 Y In 17 
of these, convictions had already been obtained; and the 
remaining were either being charged, appealed, or the 
accused was a fugitive. 
Undercover Work 
Narcotics police work at this level is not significantly 
different from traditional vice squad enforcement, but 
with more resources, partly because local drug 
enforcement is more highly supported than it was in the 
1960s; and partly because the Federal connection offers 
both more resources and a potentially higher penalty 
structure. 
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But the enforcement pattern is similar. Undercover agents 
work their way into the mid-level hierarchy and police the 
gangs or any drug organization similarly. Although the 
gangs arc thought to bring most of the crack cocaine to 
Kansas, other local drug dealers still maintain sources in 
the East and South. Typically, then, police do not target 
gang members. They target mid-level drug dealers who 
often but by no means always turn out to be LA gang 
members. 
Although undercover policing cannot be directly observed 
by an ethnographer, as warrant service and search 
procedures can, it is possible to review undercover tape 
transcripts and to interview undercover officers. Two of 
the most successful undercovcrs in Kansas City are 
Detectives Mary Brown and Donald Birdwell. Both know 
Kansas City well, arc street smart, know how to make 
drug deals and to reassure dealers that they are not police 
- the first concern of the dealer. 
"Targeting," according to Mary Brown, is the first task of 
the undercover officer. Mary Brown explains: 
"I target my subjects. When I target an 
individual I look for people who are 
associated but beneath him ... You start from 
the bottom and try and work your way up to 
the top to get to the big fish. Then you 
conduct surveillances, get license numbers, 
use the computer. I'm a firm believer in using 
that computer terminal, in digging out any 
and all intelligence information that the 
computer may have on the individual." 
The undercover officer is usually introduced to the 
"target" by an informant who may be enlisted by the 
undercover officer, or who informs the undercover that he 
has a prospect. Birdwell describes how he was introduced 
to one of Kansas City's most notorious dealers, Abdul 
Shakur: 
"One day this informant calls up and he lays 
out Abdul Shakur's operation. We'd already 
done some background on Shakur via the IRS 
and we'd heard about him from other 
agencies. So we interviewed the caller in 
person, confirmed that he had the information 
and took a go at it." 
Birdwell's "go" resulted in three taped conversations in 
which Shakur incriminated himself into what, with other 
evidence of a drug conspiracy, became a life sentence 
without possibility of parole. In one of these 
conversations, Shakur offered to sell Birdwell (disguised 
as Big Damon) as much as a kilo of cocaine, to "rock" it 
up for him, and to advise him how to conceal the profits 
through real estate purchases. Shakur's assurance that his 
cocaine is of the highest quality was clearly recorded by 
Birdwell. Shakur, the dealer, says: 
"That's one thing I like to do is keep good 
quality stuff and then you can deal with the 
people fairly because it's good. It ain't they 
smoke it up and they don't feel nothin'. It's 
gone in 2 or 3 minutes. You see what I'm 
saying, they get mad then ... Keep your 
customers happy. 'Cause they're the ones 
spending the money man." 
The undercover officer experiences a double problem. He 
or she must appear to be enough part of the drug dealing 
community to be credible. But she also has to develop 
new appearances. Mary Brown does this well. She 
describes "working" subsequent drug houses of a major 
dealer who "had dope houses set up every place ... Each 
time I'd go in and work on his dope houses, they'd bust it, 
and I'd move on to the next." 
Didn't they get to know you?" I asked. 
She replies: 
"No. I wear curlers in my hair. I change the 
color of my eyes with contact lenses. I wear 
different wigs, nail polish, jewelry- or I 
may not wear makeup at all ... It depends on 
who I'm dealing with. Ifhc's a slickster, and 
likes gold, I put rings on every finger. 
Sometimes I use a southern accent, and say 
I'm from Houston. My main problem is 
always to remember how I looked the last 
time I saw the dealer. One time I forgot which 
color eyes I wore last time. So what I did was 
put my sunglasses on. He never questioned 
me on that." 
The information provided by the undercover officer is 
used to invoke the first step of the conviction process, 
which is to establish probable cause for a search. 
Assuming that the search will produce illegal drugs and 
possibly, guns, the accused will be taken into custody. 
U.S. Attorney Linda Parker describes drug enforcement 
as "run and gun" investigations in contrast to long-range 
complex investigations that are sometimes conducted by 
the FBI. 
Long-term investigations arc valued by Federal 
authorities but on the whole are not considered 
appropriate for drug dealing, even where wider range 
conspiracies are thought to exist. Long-term 
investigations may be more successful because 
undercover buyers can work their way up the 
organization. At the same time, as buys arc made, the 
dealers remain active and "in place." Criminal activity is 
permitted, thus generating a dilemma for law enforcement 
authorities. The longer the investigation endures, the more 
successful it might be- but the more crimes will be 
committed by the perpetrators. In general, drug selling is 
regarded as so serious, authorities try to remove drug 
dealers as expeditiously as possible. 
Once a Federal arrest is made, drug dealers rarely if 
every qualify for bail under the Federal guidelines. It is 
not difficult to convince a Federal magistrate under a 
complaint and a motion for detention that a drug dealer, 
found with a sizeable quantity of drugs and guns, is likely 
to ilee or to pose a danger to the community if returned 
there. 
The prosecutor is required to present for indictment 
within 30 days of the filing of the complaint. The 
indictment is presented to the Grand Jury with, in effect, 
all of the charges. The Grand Jury will hear the 
appropriate witnesses against the accused, but since 
neither the accused nor his attorney is present, there is no 
cross-examination. Rarely, if ever, do Grand Juries fail to 
bring an indictment in a drug case. The trial date will be 
set for no less than 40, nor more than 70 days following 
the return of the indictment. Given the terms of the 
indictment, an accused can contemplate what his sentence 
will be, if convicted under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines before the trial. 
The Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual is a complex 
"grid" system which offers little discretion to the 
sentencing judge. Under it the sentence is determined by 
the offense level, on the left side of the grid, and the 
defendant's criminal history on the right. A mid-level 
dealer caught possessing 2-3.4 KG of cocaine is a level 
28. Criminal History Category's range from I through VI. 
Someone with a IV criminal history and a 28 level offense 
is looking at a sentence of 110 to 137 months, with no 
parole. Should that person have been found with 
possessing a gun, two offense levels would be added, 
resulting in a sentence of 135-168 months. 
Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198612 
while the guidelines were being developed. This Act 
effectively restricted the commission's discretion in 
establishing guidelines for drug trafficking offcnses.13 
Thus, the Guidelines arc even more severe if the cocaine 
has been processed into crack. Possession for sale of half 
a kilo of crack will bring a sentence of 15 to 20 years. 
And under the Federal statute there is no parole, although 
"good time" is available to the convict. 
Plea bargaining is said to be rare in Kansas City since the 
introduction of Federal Guideline sentencing. Judges have 
little discretion and Justice Department policy offers little 
discretion to prosecutors who are advised to support the 
Guidelines. Prosecutor Linda Parker observes: 
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"Right now we're seeing a lot more trials than 
we did a year and a half ago. I imagine that 
will change because people tend to get used to 
whatever is around for awhile. Right now 
everyone says there's no benefit to plea 
bargaining and you might as well go to trial. 
They're still remembering the benefits before 
the sentencing guidelines went into effect. 
Once they've forgotten those there might be a 
return to plea bargaining." 
The trial still disadvantages many defendants. In addition 
to the usual problems faced by defendants -appearance, 
revelation of past criminal record if they testify, the 
possibility of perjury- during the trial the defense 
attorney is not allowed to inform the jury of the size of the 
penalty, e.g., "If you find my client guilty, she will be put 
away for 25 years." Thus, in the Shakur case, he, the 
principal drug dealer, was sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole. His wife and his girlfriend were 
charged as part of the conspiracy and were sentenced to 
20 and 25 years. Whether a jury, or even a prosecutor, 
would think them deserving of such punishment is open 
to question. Under the guidelines, such penalties are 
prescribed by the Congress, and the judges have little 
authority to change them. 
The Criminal Sanction 
Do such severe penalties as the Sentencing Guidelines 
impose for drug trafficking make sense? That depends on 
one's theory of the criminal sanction, and where drug 
trafficking fits into it. Presumably, such penalties deter 
potential dealers. Doubtless they do. The question may 
not be whether they deter, however, but rather how much 
additional deterrence is drawn out of each additional 
month of sentencing and whether mandatory minimum 
sentences make sense. 
Are traffickers familiar with the guidelines, other than to 
know that stiff penalties await the convicted dealer? Do 
dealers calculate finely as between 90 or 120 months? 
Based on our interviews with dealers, it seems unlikely 
that dealers make fine calculations. They know that 
penalties arc stiff, and they develop tactics for avoiding 
them- not always successfully, or they would not be in 
prison to be interviewed. Mandatory minimum sentences 
may make sense insofar a'\ they send a "tough time" 
message to potential drug traffickers. 
At the same time, traffickers seem motivated less by the 
threat of penal severity than by the commitment to selling 
drugs. Like commuters who are daily faced with the threat 
of accident and injury, but arc committed to working, 
drug dealers "absorb" the potential threat of penalty. It is 
likely that an individual who has been imprisoned will 
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experience some deterrence in the future, should he be 
released. Yet amounts for sale arc more likely determined 
by market opportunity and norms of the drug trade than 
by a careful assessment of the federal penalty structure. 
Our interviews with police suggest much the same- that 
in the face of severe penalties dealers will take more 
precautions, be less blatant in making sales, less violent, 
operate with a lower profile. Should that happen they will 
be less publicly intrusive, but likely more elusive. As 
Detective David Starbuck, the Kansas City Police 
Department's Jamaican "specialist," commented: 
"There was kind of a lull here in 1988 
because we really stepped hard on the 
Jamaicans after they arrived here in 1985. At 
that time, what they were doing is bringing in 
dozens of young kids- Jamaicans, illegal 
aliens - out of Miami and New York to be 
dope house workers. We were frustrated, we 
would raid these houses and get nobody 
except the bottom of the ladder people." 
"More recently they've kind of changed their 
tactics and they're more involved in 
wholesaling quantities of cocaine to mid-level 
dealers ... They have established enough 
contacts with mid-level dealers where they'll 
come in here and wholesale their product and 
then be out." 
It is hard to say what the effect of the heavy Federal 
penalties has been. A recent article in the San Francisco 
Chronicle suggests that gang infiltration of American 
cities has been growing rather than diminishing, despite 
the best efforts of police and prosecutors to eliminate the 
drug tradc. 14 According to this article, some communities 
are experiencing the culture of gangs -"with its secret 
world of nicknames and hand signs, fierce territorialism 
and violence over the color of shoelaces" -as an even 
more dangerous problem than the drugs exported from 
Southern California. 
This article and our own research in Kansas City suggest 
that these "gangs" are actually not Southern California 
gangs but local youngsters who model themselves on 
Southern California gangs. At the same time, Southern 
California gang members arc the wholesalers and 
sometimes mid-level dealers who distribute drugs to the 
local sellers. Clearly, those who market the product are 
advantaged when locals identify with their gang 
affiliation. And equally clearly, committed drug dealers 
arc willing to accept the risk of imprisonment as a cost of 
doing business. 
If the threat of long prison sentences does not seem to 
significantly deter drug dealers, especially perhaps those 
associated with Los Angeles gangs, from distributing the 
profitable product, is incarceration effective? 
Theoretically, incarceration should be effective because 
drug dealers cannot distribute drugs while they are 
imprisoned. As an anti-crime strategy, the theory depends 
upon two assumptions: one, that high level dealers will 
not be involved with street selling while they are in 
prison; and, second, that there is a relatively short supply 
of replacement dealers. 
The first assumption is probably true. We did interview a 
high level dealer in Northern California imprisoned for a 
parole violation who claimed that he continued to make 
the major decisions for his gang while he was imprisoned. 
Nevertheless, incarceration must have some impact on an 
individual's ability to function as a leader. The second 
assumption, of non-replacement, is far less sustainable. 
We know that gangs continue to operate after their leaders 
are imprisoned. Not only that, we also know that street 
violence may arise when gang leaders are imprisoned. 
Incarceration thus may have the paradoxical effect of 
generating violence, with little impact on diminishing 
drug selling. 
A "just desert" rationale is probably the most sustainable 
justification for severe sentences. Yet even that rationale 
is questionable. If we regard penal sanctions as moral 
judgements, they arc rather like a ratio scale. When we 
think of common law crimes such as burglary, robbery, 
rape and homicide, we immediately recognize that they 
form such a scale. That is, we intuit that a robber 
"deserves" to be punished more severely than a burglar, 
and so forth. 
Do we have similar common intuitions about the relation 
between burglary and the sale of half a kilo of crack 
cocaine? I suggest that we do not. Difficult as it is to 
intuit the relative deserts as between classical victim 
crimes and drug trafficking, an even more difficult "just 
desert" question is posed by the penalties attached to 
trafficking in different amounts and varieties of drugs. For 
example, under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, any person who 
distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, one 
kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of heroin, or five kilograms or more of 
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
cocaine, is subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum term 
of imprisonment.15 
But why should we consider these to be equally 
deserving? Arguably, the distribution of a kilogram or 
more of cocaine is more socially destructive than the 
distribution of a kilogram of heroin. The Federal drug 
penalties may seem appropriate to some, inconsistent to 
others, and needlessly severe to still others, particularly if 
their deterrence value is relatively slight compared to the 
cost they impose on the Federal taxpayer. 
How do we measure the effect of such severe penalties as 
mandatory five- and ten-year sentences on the drug trade? 
I asked undercover officer Donald Birdwell that question 
and he replied: 
"I think we have to measure our success by 
what the prices are on the streets. If we're 
holding the line, then prices will stay up. 
We've seen (summer, 1989) an eighth of an 
ounce of cocaine - that's called an eightball 
-go from $350 to $200. The more we are 
saturated the lower the prices. I'd say we still 
have a lot of work to do." 
"What kind of work?" I asked. "People ask me if I have 
any solutions. What would you say?" He answered: 
"It's obvious who they are using to distribute 
the cocaine. They're mostly using poor black 
youths. You have to present them with a 
different alternative or method to make a 
viable living. You've got some kid living in 
the projects who doesn't have anything, no 
food to eat and he learns that he can make 
$200 a day selling crack cocaine on the 
comer, he's going to do it. So is the older guy 
who's got kids at home whose only 
alternative is a minimum wage job at 
McDonald's. The public has to be made 
aware of the importance of presenting 
different alternatives ... The only thing we 
can do is try to stop the demand, attack it on 
that front, and present alternatives to those 
that are likely to become involved in selling 
drugs." 
I asked what he thought of "boot camp" sentences of 90 
days for first time or small time sellers. He replied: 
"That won't solve the problem either. I have 
seen it happen here where if there is a group 
of five sellers, and we arrest four, the fifth 
will continue to sell. If there's one left, and he 
doesn't have any alternatives, he's going to 
continue to sell cocaine. Arresting may be a 
temporary solution, but I don't think it will 
greatly diminish cocaine trafficking." 
Our interviews with police in Kansas City and elsewhere 
suggest two sorts of attitudes being expressed. One, that 
police cannot be held responsible for solving the drug 
problem in the local community or in the United States. 
At the same time, police often express pride in their own 
work, or the work of the department. This is certainly true 
in Kansas City where the Department takes pride in its 
resourcefulness and professionalism, while recognizing 
that drugs are freely available in some sections of the city; 
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and that, despite the best efforts of law enforcement, 
prices declined in 1989. It is also true in Seattle. 
Seattle 
As a west coast city, Seattle is perhaps even more 
vulnerable to gang migration than midwestern cities. 
According to police chief Pat Fitzsimons, the crack 
phenomenon and gang migmtion began late in 1986 or 
early 1987, when police began to make arrests of 
California residents. They discovered, by checking on 
them, either that they were recognized by California 
police as being gang members, or that they were 
associated with California gang members. 
These arrests were not necessarily for drug dealing. Some 
of the arrests were for disorderly conduct. Several 
California dealers had moved in with Seattle women and 
were arrested on charges of domestic violence. Both 
police and press began to identify this as a movement of 
Los Angeles gang members to the Seattle area. And the 
media began to run series on "invasion" of the Los 
Angeles gangs. 
This sort of media attention typically offers a double 
message: one prong deplores the rise in drug dealing, its 
negative impact on the community, and the need for 
community awareness; at the same time, media attention 
publicizes the gangs and their significance, particularly 
among youngsters who might be inclined to sell drugs. 
Chief Fitzsimons estimates that there were in Seattle at 
least 500 "gang members, their associates and people who 
look like gang members who were not on the California 
gang files." The Chief, however, distinguishes between 
the migrating group who are "older" by which he means 
in their early 20's, versus the local "kids" who are legally 
"juveniles," that is, below the age of 18. 
The local gang is called the BOD's (Black Gangster 
Disciples). They are not, however, considered to be the 
middle level dealers. Much, perhaps most, of the crack 
cocaine is smuggled into Seattle by Crips and Bloods. But 
police informants reported that drugs are increasingly 
being purchased, even by LA gang distributors, from the 
Yakima, Washington area where there is a sizeable 
population of Mexican Americans and Mexican nationals. 
The cocaine moves from central America, through 
Mexico, to Yakima - and from there passes into the 
Seattle area. 
Just as in Kansas City, genuine Crips and Bloods 
characteristically will not identify themselves to the 
police. "If they say they are, they ain't" says an 
intelligence officer. But among some local youngsters, 
there is a cachet to seeming to be a member of a gang. 
Gang affiliation is said to offer a sense of status and 
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identity. "They're not academic and they're not athletic," 
says Chief Fitzsimons. He continues, 'They're looking 
for something they can say about themselves and gain a 
little status - but the real operators are not going to 
broadcast who they are, what they are, or what they do." 
And he adds, just as did one of the gang subjects we 
interviewed in prison, when we asked about gang 
affiliation outside of Los Angeles, "The color is green, 
money." 
The Seattle Department responded to the drug trafficking 
infiltration of California gangs in several ways: 
First, the Chief, who is sensitive to the importance of 
public and police coalitions for reducing neighborhood 
crime, and especially drug dealing, has created citizen 
advisory boards in each of four precincts. The main 
program is the South Seattle Precinct's Police/Community 
Crime Reduction Pilot Program, implemented in January, 
1988. The idea is to work with members of the 
community to identify crime problems- especially those 
arising out of illegal drug selling in the neighborhood. 
The project, according to Chief Fitzsimons, was "the 
result of many meetings and great effort to focus the 
concerns of the community and the limited resources of 
the Department on the local impact of a national epidemic 
and proliferation of illegal drug use. "16 
The community advisory boards grow out of the two 
ideas that have become increasingly prevalent in United 
States policing in recent years: community-oriented 
policing and problem-oriented policing.17 In keeping with 
what have by now become traditional community-
oriented policing ideas, the Department initiated 
committees to address a number of issues: business and 
block watch, community contact and support, vandalism 
and special projects, the development of volunteers. South 
Seattle residents were especially encouraged to join the 
block/business watches, and to report illegal activity 
through an anonymous hotline staffed by members of the 
South Seattle Council. 
Two of the residents, Jean Vcldwyk and Norm 
Chamberlain, were recently cited by William J. Bennett as 
"national heroes" in the "war on drugs." "They," wrote 
the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
to Chief Fitzsimons, "are living proof that uniting with the 
police and fighting the drug problem can restore these 
seemingly dismal places to health and safety."18 
As an illustration of problem-oriented policing the police 
department rearranged patrol staffing so that more than 
two officer cars were available for proactive patrol in the 
area. In addition, the Precinct Commander was afforded 
additional resources in equipment and personnel, 
including a four officer "Anti-Crime Team" to address 
specific crime problems as these arose in the area. One of 
the more publicized innovations has been a 21 man 
mountain bike patrol who brave the hills of Yesler 
Terrace, a subsidized housing complex. The police 
department says that open drug dealing and gang activity 
have dropped in areas patrolled by the bikes.19 The South 
Seattle area reported a 7.1 percent reduction in crime from 
1987, as compared with a 1.3 percent increase among the 
other three precincts during the same time period. 
Second, in addition to community-oriented and problem-
oriented policing, the department emphasizes crime 
prevention with juveniles. 
The Chief says: 
"We want a lot more done with schools, with 
truants, with programs that might help 
families and kids. The emphasis is on 
mobilizing all the local resources to say that 
this is my responsibility. We want to identify 
the kids who are at risk with the assistance of 
school security people and counselors." 
"The message we will try to bring to the kids 
is their own accountability for their actions. 
These kids are trying to gain respect, but the 
message we want to bring is that there are 
certain things you cannot do, and you will not 
gain respect if you do them. We will treat you 
as an individual, and help you as an 
individual, with your individual needs. But 
we will not do anything to build up the 
importance of your group or gang. And I 
strongly oppose recognizing your gang and 
assigning a social worker to it." 
The emphasis on juveniles is partly embodied in a 
proactive anti-gang unit. Called the Coordinated Criminal 
Investigations squad, the unit started officially in 1985 in 
response to an Asian gang massacre where 13 Chinese 
victims were hog-tied and shot in an after-hours gambling 
club. The unit, initiated primarily to monitor Asian gang 
activities, expanded both its size and jurisdiction in 1985 
to include police problems arising with Samoan and 
Philippine groups. Lt. AI Gerdus, who heads the unit, 
comments: 
"Whether they (the Samoan and Philippine 
groups) were legitimate gangs is a debatable 
issue. By most standards they wouldn't be, 
but they were ethnic groups that were running 
together and were occasionally involved in 
criminal activities." He adds, "Identifying a 
gang is a complicated business. Where does a 
social group tum into a criminal gang? Where 
is the magic line of demarcation? You have to 
avoid identifying a bunch of kids that run 
together and sometimes fight with another 
bunch as a criminal gang. You want to avoid 
calling a football team a gang." 
Members of the gang unit work with school officials, 
truant officers, and families of youngsters who appear to 
assume a gang identity. A related intelligence unit 
identifies persons, many of them not juveniles, as gang 
members or affiliates. Thus, the anti-gang unit maintains a 
wall with a visible photo gallery identifying such persons. 
Finally, the unit will send out a team of ten or 12 officers 
to monitor and contain gang activity in the 
neighborhoods. I spent an evening riding with and 
observing such a team. 
When a researcher moves from the interview as a research 
tool to participant observation, things happen. Concepts 
like "proactive," "gang" and "gang affiliated" become 
infused with reality - which, in practice, means 
uncertainty. When I began to practice participant 
observation with police nearly 30 years ago, I coined the 
concept of "the symbolic assailant." I wrote: 
"The policeman, because his work requires 
him to be occupied continually with potential 
violence, develops a perceptual shorthand to 
identify certain kinds of people as symbolic 
assailants, that is, as persons who use gesture, 
language, and attire that the policeman has 
come to recognize as a prelude to violence. 
This does not mean that violence by the 
symbolic assailant is predictable. On the 
contrary, the policeman responds to the vague 
indication of danger suggested by 
appearance. •'20 
The police of another era were concerned primarily with 
burglars, robbers, and rapists. Recall Officer McFadden, 
the legendary Cleveland plainclothes detective, whose 
observation that "crime was afoot" when he observed 
three suspects casing a jewelry store, led to the landmark 
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The officer, 
whose observations led him to believe that the suspects 
were planning a stickup, asked Terry to identify himself. 
When Terry only mumbled something, Officer McFadden 
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket. 
McFadden felt a pistol, which he removed. The officer 
frisked Terry's companions and uncovered another pistol. 
Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and 
moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that he was 
unreasonably searched and seized. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren deferred to the expertise of the 
experienced officer and authorized police to "stop and 
frisk" when they do not have "probable cause" to believe 
that a crime has been or is being committed, that is, to 
make an arrest; and to use evidence obtained from the 
frisk. 
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However ambiguous traditional criminal procedural 
concepts like "stop and frisk" or even "probable cause" 
may be, they are grounded in situations described in 
cases, and are continually being retested in the courts. But 
the activities of a proactive anti-gang unit are not so 
constrained, particularly if the objective is not necessarily 
to arrest, but t.o be a presence in the community. In this 
situation, the prevailing norms for police conduct do not 
derive primarily from the Fourth Amendment and cases 
interpreting its sometimes arcane clauses. 
The norms are those communicated partly by 
management cops, partly by understandings within the 
unit itself, and partly by a few of the more aggressive 
officers within it. The norms governing the unit's purpose 
and operational style were not entirely clear. The Chief 
viewed the unit as a community- and problem-oriented 
policing unit. A mid-level officer, speaking informally, 
described the unit as quite different from a narcotics 
enforcement unit, which develops informants, makes buys 
and serves narcotics search warrants. It was described 
instead as follows: 
"It is proactive on the streets. Inside the 
department it is informally called the B-team 
because it deals with black gangs on the 
streets. And it uses an in-your-face approach 
to these gangs." 
Here is what my notes and recollections show that this 
was an :tccurate description of the unit's approach. The 
notes say: 
Several black teenagers are standing on a 
street corner outside a neighborhood grocery. 
One of them is holding a brown paper bag. 
The officers I am riding with, one black, one 
white, stop the car, take away the bag (it 
contains an unopened can of beer) and frisk 
the young man. He is ordered to kneel on his 
knees, with his hands behind his head; then to 
remove his sneakers and socks, turn his socks 
inside out. His ID reveals that he is 19 years 
old, and a neighborhood resident. He is told t.o 
go home and not to return to the corner. 
Similar searches are made by the same group of officers 
of other black teenagers. One group is gathered around a 
bench in a public park. They are similarly instructed to 
kneel, remove shoes and socks, aggressively questioned 
and searched. No weapons and drugs are found, although 
one of the young men who was searched possessed a 
beeper and $200 in cash- strongly suggesting that he 
was involved in dealing drugs. 
When I interviewed the police about the tactics I had 
observed, they believed that they were carrying out the 
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mandate of the unit - which was t.o "harass" teenagers 
congregating on the streets in areas where drug dealing 
gangs were thought t.o operate. When I asked the Chief 
about the tactics, he was visibly concerned, and attributed 
the tactics partly t.o a misinformed understanding by the 
rank and file in the unit as to the unit's mandate, and in 
larger part to the over-aggressiveness of some individuals 
assigned to the unit. 
However one interprets these observations, several things 
are clear: first, patrol policing has always offered 
enormous discretion to the individual officer or to groups 
of officers working together. This discretion is informed 
by the officer's values and understandings of the nature of 
the job. During the 1960s and '70s police departments and 
individual police became increasingly sensitized to inner 
city needs and demands for even handed enforcement. In 
part, this resulted in the community-oriented policing 
movement. 
But the rise of crack dealing in the late 1980s has 
complicated the whole issue of police discretion and 
community relations. The organized South Seattle 
community demands that the police "crack down" on the 
dmg dealers and criminal gangs in general. Thoughtful 
police chiefs find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. 
The problem crack dealing poses for a responsive police 
chief is how to effectively police the gangs - who do 
exist but for whose existence it is difficult t.o draft 
criminal statutes- and yet not routinely harass 
teenagers, particularly black teenagers, whose only crime 
is street socializing. 
There is no problem in enforcing the criminal law. Police 
know how to make a buy in a crack house, obtain a 
warrant, search, seize evidence and convict. 
Far more problematic is the mandate of a proactive anti-
gang unit. If the mandate is to "take back the streets" 
rather than t.o enforce the criminal law, such a unit may 
pose a threat both to the civil liberties of individual 
citizens and to police-citizen relations as a whole. If the 
police are reluctant to employ such measures, many 
residents will predictably criticize the police for failing to 
insure the public safety that neighborhood residents often 
demand. Police may succeed in deterring some street drug 
dealers when they employ "in-your-face" tactics. But they 
may also inflame anti-police attitudes at a time when 
more than ever police need the support and cooperation of 
the communities they are overseeing. In any event, the 
possibilities and limitations of proactive anti -gang 
policing are an important policing issue, which surely 
needs more observation and discussion. 
Los Angeles 
The drug problem, with associated street dealing, has 
spread from the inner city of Los Angeles, places like 
Watts and neighboring Compton, the indigenous home of 
Crips and Bloods, to the San Fernando Valley. Street drug 
dealing has become a major problem in these populous 
bedroom communities of greater Los Angeles, places like 
Van Nuys, Blyth and Panorama City. These communities 
are not the glamorous Los Angeles typically portrayed in 
movies and television, not Beverly Hills, Belair or 
Malibu. The San Fernando Valley is in hot and smoggy 
East Los Angeles, at best a 45 minute drive from the 
beaches of Malibu and Santa Monica. Houses and 
apartments suggest neither wealth nor poverty. The San 
Fernando Valley is a heartland residential area where a 
range of ordinary people - some with families, working 
people, professionals - make their home. The Valley is 
the bedroom of Los Angeles as Brooklyn, Queens and 
Long Island serve that function for Manhattan. 
On August 11, 1989, reporter Tracey Kaplan, herself a 
Valley resident, reported in the Valley edition of the )he 
Los Angeles Times on an interesting and controversial 
strategy for addressing the street drug dealing problem.21 
"Apartment owners along a notoriously crime ridden 
street," the lead reported, "took the unprecedented step 
Thursday of offering private money to increase police 
patrols in their neighborhood." Five apartment owners 
came forward with the money and said they could raise 
comparable funds from another 30 apartment owners 
along a half-mile stretch of Blythe Street between Van 
Nuys Boulevard and Brimfield Avenue. That stretch has 
been inundated by drug dealers who rent local apartments 
and then sell their wares from the curb. Police had for two 
years campaigned to crush the drug trade, but with little 
success. 
The story went on to report that a City council member, 
Ernani Bernardi, was enthusiastic about the idea and said 
that he would try in every way to get the money through 
to the city council. A special narcotics task force, 
composed of 13 uniformed officers borrowed from police 
divisions throughout the San Fernando Valley, had 
combed the area for nearly two years, and had succeeded 
somewhat in controlling the drug traffic. But when the 
funds ran out, the unit had to be disbanded and the dealers 
returned. 
"You've got a prison on Blythe Street right now, and your 
guards are the drug dealers. A lot has been done to clean 
up the area already, but we had to cut back when the 
money ran out. These people feel that added security is 
going to help them," said Councilman Bernardi. 
But a police official who attended the meeting, Valley 
Bureau Cmdr. Chet Spencer, was skeptical of the idea. He 
praised the apartment owners and managers for coming 
together to fight the Blythe Street drug problem. But he 
feared that allowing property owners to donate money for 
increased patrols might set an unfair precedent, since, if 
enacted, such a proposal could allow wealthier 
neighborhoods to buy more security at the cost of less 
protection to poor neighborhoods. 
A similar, but not identical, initiative arose later in the 
year. Police responded to another of the Valley's "hot 
spots" by barricading a 12-square block area to curtail 
drive-by drug sales. The barricade resulted in some 
inconvenience to residents, but they apparently felt the 
cost was worth the advantage in reducing drug sales in the 
area. According to another Los Angeles Times report, a 
group of Sepulveda apartment owners formed a 
committee to study the possibility, not only of retaining 
the barricade, but of establishing a guard station at the 
entrance. The City Council was faced with two issues: 
should it approve permanently removing streets from 
public use?; and could the apartment owners pass on part 
of t11e maintenance of the guardhouse- which might 
cost from $6,000 to $9,000 per month, depending on 
whether the guard was armed? One of the property 
owners said, however, that the cost of the guardhouse 
should be borne by the taxpayers, who pay for police 
services, rather than the neighborhood apartment owners, 
and ultimately the renters. 
Police Captain Mark D. Stevens favored payment by the 
apartment owners, according to the Los Angeles Times 
story. He reported that in the two weeks since police put 
up the sawhorse barricades, drug traffic has virtually been 
wiped out in the area.22 He added, however, that some 
property owners expressed concerns about the appearance 
of the guardhouse, since the area would no longer look 
like a neighborhood, not the kind of place you or I would 
want to live in. 
The "barricade" initiative received considerable media 
attention in the Los Angeles area. This author was asked 
by the Los Angeles Ti~ to offer an opinion of the 
barricade idea. Rather than offer an opinion I decided to 
visit the area and talk further with the police since the 
barricade was both an intriguing and controversial idea, 
which raised fundamental questions about the limits of 
community policing. 
First, it raised questions about how we as a society 
properly define public and private space. Public and 
private seem to be defined not by ownership, but by 
norms regarding the propriety of function. Thus, the 
Pentagon or an Army base, or a police station, or a 
courthouse, all of which are publicly owned, clearly are 
permitted to maintain guardposts to achieve security. 
Those who enter may be required to identify themselves 
and to be searched. But would it be permissible to erect a 
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fence around Central Park in New York City, and search 
everyone who enters in the interest of security? Under 
those conditions, Central Park would surely be a safer 
place, but would it be a "park?" Is a neighborhood 
threatened by drug dealing more like an army base or 
more like a park? This seemed to be a central question 
regarding the barricade initiative. 
Second, even if the barricade was permissible, who 
should pay for it? And especially who should pay for 
additional security measures such as a guardhouse? 
Should it be the responsibility of the local community 
who will benefit from it and inconvenience other 
members of the public; or should it be the responsibility 
of the local community? 
Third, what measures, if any, should a community be 
forbidden to employ to increase public safety? Can it add 
other security measures, such as secret cameras? Could it 
exclude persons from residency based on certain social 
characteristics which are shown to be correlated with 
crime? 
I"ourth, assuming that a barricade is effective in a given 
community, what will its effect be on the larger 
community. Suppose the drug dealers are driven out of a 
particular 12-square block area, but they move to another 
area a mile or two away? Who should determine whether 
the first barricade should be allowed to continue? Should 
it be the residents of the first community; or the second; 
or the police? What is the obligation of the police 
assigned to that community? Should it be to the interests 
of the local community, or the broader community, should 
those interests diverge? 
These are issues on which the police obviously are 
themselves divided. I interviewed Lt. Gary Rogness of the 
LAPD's narcotics division stationed in Van Nuys, who 
described the development of the Sepulveda barrier, and 
who is himself somewhat divided on the barrier as a 
tactic. Describing the area where the most recent barrier 
was constructed, he said: 
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"Well, it's what we term a 'hot spot' down 
there, we have many of them in the Valley. 
That one was just getting so far out of hand. 
We've tried, we have been down there in a 
very aggressive enforcement posture, making 
lots of arrests, not only against the dealers but 
we've done operations against the customers 
as well. There's a new law on the books here 
in California that allows us to arrest 
customers just for merely soliciting to buy 
drugs. So we've really attacked both sides of 
the equation, both supply and demand. That 
was augmented by uniformed foot beats, 
special details to go in there and have more 
visible presence and that still didn't seem to 
be driving the drug dealers out." 
"I think drug sales in that particular area are 
almost non-existent now. But it's like, so 
typical of law enforcement. You put a lot of 
pressure on one particular area and it just 
springs up someplace else, so now we have a 
• problem three blocks over on Orion Street." 
I asked him how the residents of the barricaded area had 
responded. How did they feel about being 
inconvenienced? He replied: 
"Well, if it gets rid of the dope dealers out 
there on the streets, the little bit of 
inconvenience you have I'm sure is worth it. I 
know if I lived there I'd like it. But it's kind 
of a sad commentary on the state of affairs 
right now in this country, this city where you 
get to the point where you're blocking off 
public streets. But if that's what it takes ... It 
seems to be working." 
At the same time, he stressed that although the barricade 
might prove to solve the immediate problem of a 
particular community or neighborhood, it created 
problems for the larger residential area. He observed: 
"Let's just take a hypothetical case study in 
the San Fernando Valley, just the valley and 
now we end up barricading every known hot 
spot. OK, I've got a list of about 35 or 40 of 
them. And then a month from now we fmd 
out the problem has sprung up in adjacent 
areas so we go and we barricade them. And 
then it springs up over there and pretty soon 
we've got the entire valley in this maze ... 
The only real solution to this problem is to get 
rid of the demand." 
New York 
New York City does not have a cultural gang problem but 
it surely has a huge and largely intractable drug problem. 
More than 1,800 NYPD officers are assigned to the 
Narcotics Division, a force larger than many entire uolice 
departments for middle and larger sized departments in 
the United States. (fhe entire Kansas City Police 
Department reports 1,136 sworn officers, while Seattle's 
Police Department is of similar size with 1,148 sworn 
officers.) 
NYPD's Narcotics Division is primarily responsible for 
narcotics enforcement, although nearly half of those 
arrested for narcotics violations arc arr<.:sted by the patrol 
force, who may actually be arresting for some other 
violation. After the arrest is made, the officers may 
discover a quantity of narcotics in the possession of the 
arrested person. The following table shows Narcotics 
Division Activity for October 1988 and October 1989. 
The Narcotics Division of the NYPD engages in a broad 
spectrum of enforcement activities, ranging from a Career 
Drug Felony Offender Program, which, by pulling 
together information from a variety of agencies, targets 
recidivist drug distributors whose career drug activities 
might otherwise remain obscure; a Drug Enforcement 
Task Force, which works with the DEA to target higher 
level dealers; and a Joint Organized Crime/Narcotics Task 
Force, which similarly works alongside the FBI. 
Nearly half the officers who work in the Narcotics 
Division are assigned to Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT). 
From the NYPD's perspective TNT is an "enforcement 
overlay" that contributes powerfully to the Department's 
capacity to enforce narcotics laws. 
Each TNT "team" is composed of 117 Narcotics 
investigators, who in turn are divided into working 
"modules" composed of a sergeant, five casually attired 
plainclothes officers, and two undercover officers. One 
functions as a buyer and the other as a "ghost" who 
monitors the buyer on the street, and relays messages 
back to the other officers, particularly the sergeant. This 
communication is often tense. This is partly because 
activities and scenes shift quickly. TNT arrests are often 
made on crowded New York streets. The seller is 
described as precisely as possible by the ghost, but a 
corner on upper Broadway may have ten or 15 people 
walking in four different directions. The police want to 
focus on the perpetrator, not an innocent bystander. 
Besides, undercover buying can be extremely dangerous 
to the police, the sellers and bystanders should shooting 
occur. I have witnessed, on a surveillance tape, an 
undercover officer shoot a seller who reached for his gun 
after the buyer pulled a gun, and then announced that he 
was a police officer. Did the buyer believe the seller 
actually was a police officer?; or did he think he was 
being robbed by a drug dealer who was going to pay for 
his drugs with a bullet? In a lawless setting of false 
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Heroin ...................... .. 
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Currency .................. .. 
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the crooks; and who are the "legitimate" crooks- buyers 
and sellers who are actually buying and selling- rather 
than robbers who say they want to buy or sell drugs? 
Recently, in New York City, three DEA Task Force 
officers were shot and one killed, while attempting to 
make an undercover buy. Apparently, the drug sellers 
were trying to rob the buyers, whom they apparently did 
not suspect of being police. 
What is the theory behind TNT? At one level, the TNT 
approach to drug enforcement attacks street drug dealing 
by employing traditional "buy-bust" operations. By 
working with other government agencies and local 
community groups, TNT teams develop a list of drug 
dealing sites to explore. In some areas in NYC, as in 
Washington Heights, the street drug dealing can be fairly 
evident even to the casual observer. Still, TNT will 
investigate citizen complaints that drugs are being sold 
from a particular location. Manhattan North's Lt. Sullivan 
explained TNT's function as follows: 
"Our function is basically this: If somebody 
walks out of their door or gets off a bus from 
work and goes to walk to their house, our job 
is to see to it that some guy isn't going to stuff 
the dope in his face, want him to buy it; or tell 
him to get lost for an hour, they're busy 
selling dope in front of his house." 
Sometimes reports of drug selling in front of houses can 
be verified, sometimes they cannot. Drug dealers may 
shift their location, or sell when they have a supply. 
Selling may go on for a couple of hours at a time, and 
then cease for any number of reasons. Drug dealers 
cannot openly advertise their wares, they may run out of 
drugs, they may decide to close down for dinner, they 
may decide to move to a different location. The reality of 
"buy-bust" as I experienced it riding with two different 
teams is like much of police work, involving long periods 
of boredom and waiting, periods of disappointment when 
tips do not prove fruitful, and interspersed by briefer 
periods of tense activity when they do. 
But TNT aspires to be more than an ordinary "buy-bust" 
tactic. On a strategic level, the team concept is area 
focused. For example, I accompanied a unit working in 
Manhattan North's 28th Precinct, a very small precinct of 
approximately one-half square mile. The 117 officer team 
will "saturate" that area for a period of approximately 90 
days, arresting street dealers and those who sell out of 
houses and apartments. These arrests may produce 
evidence or information for a warrant search as well. As 
one officer I interviewed stated: "We will effectively take 
the blatant sellers off the street for a period of time." 
What happens in an area when the TNT unit leaves? 
Officers acknowledge that sellers return to the area, 
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although perhaps fewer than were street selling prior to 
the TNT "saturation." TNT officers understand that their 
effect is limited, and that their presence may displace 
dealers to adjoining areas. So when they leave the area, 
and move on, they return periodically to continue 
enforcement and to communicate to the street dealers that 
the area still remains under TNT surveillance. 
How effective is TNT? The program, in enhanced form, is 
currently being evaluated by the VERA Foundation. The 
enhancement consists of deploying a squad of 20 foot 
patrol officers on the main street of a neighborhood, to 
remind both the residents and the dealers of a police 
presence. They are doubtless effective, and law abiding 
residents and small business people are doubtless grateful 
for their presence. 
The question for a TNT evaluation is not whether it is 
effective, but rather how it compares to alternative law 
enforcement tactics. Do TNT "modules" make 
significantly more arrests than foot patrolmen would in 
comparably drug infested areas? (TNT officers average 
about an arrest per officer in an eight-hour shift). Would 
foot patrolmen make significantly fewer arrests? Even if 
they did not, would the presence of foot patrolmen deter 
dealers more effectively than undercover buyers? TNT 
thus raises a question that has long bedeviled police 
managers, especially regarding street drug dealers: to 
what extent should arrest and conviction be the goal of 
police, and to what extent should public feelings of safety 
and civility be the goal. If the former is the primary goal, 
TNT is a useful strategy, but if the latter is the goal, an 
enhanced foot patrol presence, e.g., Operation Pressure 
Point and other forms of enhanced patrol, ought to be the 
primary narcotics enforcement strategy. 
The Limits of Law Enforcement 
In larger perspective, the law enforcement response to 
drug distribution in the United States, whether by one 
strategy or another, must be understood to be structurally 
limited. A variety of structural factors impede the law 
enforcement response to gangs and to drug trafficking 
more generally. These limitations are virtually inevitable 
in the context of enforcing the criminal law: (1) in a 
democratic, free society; (2) against crimes based on a 
market economy, and; (3) involving entrepreneurs who 
sell products that are popular and illegal. 
The United States Constitution, as well as our traditions 
of fairness and due process of law flowing from that 
Constitution, limits the discretionary authority of law 
enforcement. In a totalitarian society, operating outside 
constitutional restraints, police could enforce a rule that 
anyone possessing or selling illegal drugs, or even 
suspected of possessing or selling illegal drugs, will be 
summarily executed by a special police narcotics unit. 
But that hypothetical totalitarian society's narcotics police 
would not constitute what we in this society mean by 
"police." For although it is true that under the 
Constitution police arv invested with awesome powers -
to arrest, detain, search and use deadly force - all of 
these are monitored and constrained by our Constitution. 
One would hope that few of us would choose to live in a 
totalitarian society, which offers boundless discretion to 
law enforcement. At the same time, we must realize that 
there is always a tension between due process and crime 
control, and that the Constitutional framework within 
which law enforcement operates properly limits law 
enforcement in its capacity to control illegal drug sale and 
use. 
But if Constitutional norms place limits on the efficiency 
of law enforcement, economic imperatives may impose 
equal or greater ones. In evaluating our law enforcement 
efforts we must be sensitive to the relationship between 
demand and supply in the illegal drug market. The 
National Drug Control Strategy, published in September 
1989, acknowledges that "[d]espite interdiction's 
successful disruptions of trafficking pattern, the supply of 
illegal drugs entering the United States has, by all 
estimates, continued to grow."23 Why should that have 
happened? One part of the reason is that demand 
generates supply - for drugs just i ·. for video cassette 
recorders. 
United States and European demand for drugs has 
contributed to a rise in the number of producers from a 
variety of producing countries. Some of these are political 
allies, others are not. Key is the fact that demand has 
generated multiple drug producers, followed by a rise in 
production, with a subsequent drop in price. As Edmundo 
Morales observes, "Unquestionably, drug production and 
traffic in Peru have addicted thousands of people to illegal 
sources of hard cash."24 Price reduction in tum further 
invigorates demand - which stimulates the whole cycle 
over again. 
Closely related is what might be termed the Darwinian 
Trafficker Dilemma. "As we have expanded our 
interdiction efforts, the Strategy continues, "we have 
seized increasing amounts of illegal drugs. Stepped up 
interdiction has also forced drug traffickers to make 
significant operational changes ... Every time we disrupt 
or close a particular trafficking route, we have found that 
traffickers resort to other smuggling tactics that are even 
more difficult to dctect."26 So as we develop increasingly 
sophisticated tactics for reducing both narcotic production 
and smuggling, only the stronger and more efficient 
producers and smugglers survive. This in turn heightens 
supply and lowers cost. As this occurs, suppliers seek 
wider markets, particularly in distressed populations, just 
as segments of the alcohol and tobacco industries do. 
It is difficult to achieve successful interdiction for another 
reason as well. According to Rand Corporation economist 
Peter Reuter, who studied whether our borders can be 
sealed against illegal drugs for the Department of 
Defense, our Mexican border is especially permeable. 
There are few barriers from the south to bringing drugs 
into that country, and the drugs can be "brought across by 
small plane, private vehicle, or even by boat."26 A 
Mexican-American California narcotics agent made a 
similar observation to me in an interview in 1989: "Four 
hundred thousand of my people cross the border every 
year. How can you stop a much smaller number who are 
carrying a kilo or two of cocaine on their back?" 
A related issue discussed by Reuter is the limited costs 
which interdiction can impose. Interdiction is supposed to 
reduce street sales by increasing production and 
smuggling costs- in effect, taxing these- and thus 
raising the street price. This assumes that production and 
smuggling costs constitute a significant percentage of 
street price. But it is relatively cheap to produce and 
refine a kilo of cocaine, perhaps around $1 ,000 for a kilo 
that might eventually, when broken down into quarter or 
even eight gram units, retail for $250,000. Smuggling 
costs might amount to an additional few percent of the 
retail price. Most of the retail price is divided among 
those who distribute it on this side of the border. Rand 
economist Peter Reuter writes, "Fully 99 percent of the 
price of the drug when sold on the streets in the United 
States is accounted for by payments to people who 
distribute it."27 We found a similar pattern in our study of 
gang migration. As we reported above, gang members 
migrate because they can double or triple their prices in 
the Midwest over what they can demand in central Los 
Angeles. Thus, a doubling or tripling of smuggling costs 
would have a negligible impact on street price anywhere 
in the U.S., but especially when gangs double or triple 
their profits by extending the marketplace. 
During the summer of 1989, police reported that gangs 
(and others) were primarily marketing crack cocaine, 
alLhough other illegal drugs were available as well. In any 
event, crack cocaine was the marketing preference of the 
LA street gangs, upon whom our attention was focused, 
as well as the Dominican and Jamaican gangs in NYC. 
From a longer range policy perspective, however, we 
should not assume the stability of drug preference among 
those who enjoy faster living through chemistry. We 
know from history that drug preference, the epidemiology 
of drug use, is less related to the intrinsic properties of a 
drug than to the social definition of a particular substance 
as the drug of choice. Twenty or 30 years ago, heroin was 
the "problem" drug in American society.28 Today it is 
crack cocaine. 
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Suppose we actually could destroy the Peruvian, Bolivian 
and Columbian cocaine fields? Lurking in the background 
are a variety of manufactured drugs. It is likely that 
underground chemists could design and manufacture what 
addicts would consider the ideal drug - one with the kick 
of crack and the longevity of crank (methamphetamine). 
If we succeed in destroying agricultural drugs, we may 
find ourselves looking at a designer drug problem more 
potent and destructive than anything we have yet seen. 
Indeed, a powerful new drug, a colorless and odorless 
form of crystal methamphetamine - street name "ice" -
is said to be sweeping Hawaii and is threatening to invade 
the West Coast ports of San Francisco, Los Angeles and 
Portland.29 Should that happen it would only be a matter 
of time before the drug found its way across the country 
to replace "crack" as the drug of choice during the 1990s. 
The only good news "ice" will bring is its economic 
challenge to the Medallin Cartel - but it is doubtful that 
the distributors of the new drug will prove more 
concerned for public health and safety than the cocaine 
producers. 
Moreover, as we attempt to put pressure on foreign 
producers we will have to work with authorities in such 
countries as Columbia, Bolivia, Panama and Peru. The 
bribe is a familiar part of law enforcement in these 
countries. Thus, the State Department's Bureau of 
International Narcotics Matters found that Jorge Luis 
Ochoa, a major Columbian drug trafficker, "was able to 
buy his freedom through the intimidated and vulnerable 
Columbian judicial system."30 Tina Rosenberg observes: 
"In general, the closer an institution gets to 
the traffickers, the more corrupt it becomes. 
Cocaine's new income opportunities for 
judges have been well documented. 
Prosecutors are less corrupt, but it is a matter 
of logistics, not morals: it is simply easier to 
win cases by bribing judges, or the police ... 
Policemen, the infantry in the war on drugs, 
are usually young men from slum 
neighborhoods with third gmde educations-
exactly the profile of a drug dealer, and the 
line between the two tends to blur on the 
job."31 
No matter how honest US drug enforcement agents, they 
may find themselves operating in a climate of official 
corruption. 
What of our urban police? Unfortunately, we are all too 
familiar with the legendary narcotics scandals which have 
bedeviled the police in various cities. Perhaps the most 
famous have occurred in New York City beginning with 
the Knapp Commission investigations, including not only 
narcotics, but other forms of vice as well. Patrick V. 
Murphy was recruited as a reform police Commissioner in 
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New York in the wake of the scandal uncovered by the 
Knapp Commission. In his autobiography he writes: 
"[W]e ultimately discovered that the narcotics 
units under the previous police administration 
had made major contributions to the city's 
drug traffic. It was this area of corruption 
more than anything else which most shocked 
me."32 
Narcotics corruption is not confined to New York City or 
to the east coast. Deputies in the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Department were recently involved in what the 
Los Angeles Times called "one of the worst corruption 
cases" in the Department's history. Videotape shows one 
deputy hurriedly taking three $10,000 bundles of $100 
bills from a dealer's shoulder bag and putting them into 
his partner's leather briefcase.33 Although the possibilities 
of corruption obtain in any form of vice enforcement, 
only in drug enforcement do we encounter large sums of 
cash and drugs held by perpetrators who are in no position 
to complain against being ripped off by police. 
By no means am I suggesting that all narcotics police are 
corrupt. On the contrary, any number of aware police 
managers, for whom Patrick Murphy has served as an 
example of the thoughtful and honest police executive, 
struggle with the potential problem. The Los Angeles 
deputies were caught in a sting operation instituted by 
Sheriff Sherman Block. High level New York City 
narcotics officials, whom I interviewed, stressed that 
integrity and police safety were the two paramount 
features of narcotics enforcement in New York City. I am 
suggesting that it is difficult to uncover narcotics 
corruption particularly when a small number of 
individuals are involved; that whatever is discovered is 
likely to be the tip of the corruption iceberg; and that 
coiTuption needs to be counted as one of the anticipated 
costs of drug law enforcement. 
Prison overcrowding offers an additional limitation on the 
capacity of law enforcement to incarcerate drug offenders. 
State and Federal prison populations expanded in 
unprecedented numbers during the 1980s. The Bureau of 
Justice Statistics reported at the end of 1988 that the 
number of U.S. prisoners set a new record for the 14th 
consecutive year. The Bureau counted 329,821 inmates in 
1980. By 1988, that figure had risen to 627,402. Projected 
from Department of Justice figures by The Sentencing 
Project of Washington, D.C. the total for 1989 will 
include 731,978 in Federal and State prisons, and 341,851 
in local jails --1,055,829 altogether.34 Overcrowded jails 
and prisons are caused partly by newly convicted 
criminals, but also by criminals whose probation and 
parole were revoked largely because t11ey failed their 
drugs tests when released to the community. 
California, for example, had a 3,200 percent increase of 
parole violators returned to prison between 1978 and 
1988.35 
As our advanced drug testing technology consigns more 
parolees and probationers to prison, we find we cannot 
continue to convict and impose longer sentences without 
building new prisons. The need for prison and jail 
capacity is widely recognized. The National Drug 
~thus recognizes the critical lack of prison space 
as we expand law enforcement. It observes that "Most 
state prisons are already operating far above their 
designed capacity." And also that "many states have 
been forced under court order to release prisoners before 
their terms have been served whenever a court-
established prison population limit has been 
exceeded. "36 In recognition of the shortage of prison 
space to house convicted offenders and probation and 
parole violators, state governments must persuade 
their citizens to support new prisons. "The task of 
building prisons remains with state governments, who 
poorly serve their constituents when prison construction is 
stalled or resisted." 37 Unfortunately, such exhortation 
may not prove to be practical. Even those citizens who 
demand longer and more certain sentences are reluctant to 
pay for prisons and sometimes even more reluctant to live 
next door to them. Thus, highly publicized plans for a 700 
bed Federal prison to house convicted Washington, D.C. 
drug dealers at Fort Meade, MD. were withdrawn the day 
after they were announced, The New York Times 
reported, because "there was too much public 
resistance. "38 
Even if we could build new prisons, imprisonment is not 
necessarily stigmatic, nor entirely foreboding for those 
who sell drugs. In our interviews with imprisoned 
California drug dealers39 we found that imprisonment may 
offer a kind of "homeboy" status, especially for gang 
youth, for whom the prison can become an alternative 
neighborhood. Moreover, imprisonment often motivates 
prisoners in their troublesome ways. Consigned to the 
margins of society anyhow, in prison they join gangs, use 
drugs, and make useful connections for buying and selling 
drugs. The penitentiary was perhaps once a place for 
experiencing penance. Today's correctional institutions, 
overcrowded as they are with short term parole violators 
(many of whom have failed their court mandated drug 
tests) often serve functions similar to those conventions 
perform for academics and business people - as an 
opportunity for networking. 
When we incarcerate drug dealers in prisons, we also 
encounter what might be termed the Felix Mitchell 
Paradox, in honor of the West Coast's formerly most 
infamous drug distributor. In the mid-1980s, a Federal 
Strike Force, with considerable assistance and dogged 
investigation by an incorruptible Oakland Police vice 
squad, succeeded in convicting and imprisoning the East 
Bay's three leading drug dealers. Among these was the 
legendary Felix Mitchell, who was later killed in 
Leavenwmth Federal Prison and was a hero to the 
thousands who turned out for his funeral.40 Theoretically, 
Oakland's streets should have been cleansed of drugs. Did 
that happen? Hardly. The main result was a drop in price 
and a rise in street homicides and felonious assaults by 
gang members as they challenged each other for market 
share. As territorial arrangements have stabilized, so has 
the homicide rate - but the street price of crack has 
remained about the same or declined. 
Peter Reuter makes a similar observation concerning the 
District of Columbia's soaring homicide rate. Reuter 
argues that when the supply of drug dealers exceeds the 
demand for drugs, "one obvious way to raise earnings is 
to eliminate the competition through violence." Inactivity 
by the District's police during the 1980s might be an 
alternative explanation. But the arrest data show the 
opposite, that is, a sharp rise in activity. Only 58 juveniles 
had been arrested for dealing offenses in 1981; by 1987 
that figure had reached 1,550. In 1981 adult arrests-
usually of men in their early twenties -totaled 408; by 
1987 it was 5,297.41 
Similarly, the escalation in drug selling and violence in 
Oakland, California, persuaded the legislature and the 
Governor to provide four million dollars from 1985 to 
1987 to bolster and expand prosecution, probation and the 
courts. UC Berkeley's Center for the Study of Law and 
Society was contracted to evaluate the initiative. Malcolm 
Feeley, Richard Berk, Roseann Greenspan and I formed a 
research team to undertake the evaluation. Following an 
ethnographic and statistical study, we concluded that all 
of the law enforcement agencies carried out their mandate 
thoroughly and professionally; and that the intermediate 
goals of more prosecutions, more convictions and more 
probation violations were met. Unfortunately, crime, and 
narcotics crime in particular, continued to increase. So we 
concluded that, contrary to popular mythology, "The rise 
in narcotics crime in Alameda County cannot be 
attributed to inefficient courts, prosecutors, probation 
officers or police."42 
Still, of all the enforcement initiatives, the least effective 
will be those aimed at military interdiction, the most 
satisfying-- at least initially- those which involve the 
community and local police. The Strategy argues that 
"The first challenge facing our criminal justice system is 
to help reclaim neighborhoods that have been rendered 
unsafe by drugs." How we do that is not entirely clear. In 
a recent National Institute of Justice publication Mark 
Kleiman, a proponent of street level drug enforcement, 
points to two special threats that street drug dealing poses: 
that children may become users, and that street dealing 
may become disruptive or violent.43 
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There is much disagreement, however, about the 
effectiveness of neighborhood police crackdowns.44 In the 
same publication, prosecutor Kevin Burke favors street 
level enforcement, arguing that "[W]hen balanced against 
the environment of an open drug market, a visible, active 
police presence is not a tremendous intrusion and 
therefore not a significant cost of a street-level 
operation."45 Thus, although initiatives like New York 
City's Operation Pressure Point and other buy-bust 
enterprises are limited in their effectiveness, at least they 
are directly responsive to citizen calls for assistance. Of 
course, drug dealers may displace their operations in 
response to police initiatives, but a police presence may 
be valuable in reducing fear of crime if not crime itself. 
At the same time, some law enforcement officials are 
skeptical about the positive effects of crackdowns. 
Minneapolis police chief Anthony Bouza writes: 
"Focused, saturation street enforcement will 
clean up an area, but it is costly and 
inefficient. It robs other areas of their fair 
share of scarce resources and it does not 
eliminate the intractable problem of drug 
dealing, merely displaces it. It also focuses, 
inefficiently, on the lowest level of the 
criminal chain and is sure to lead to abuses 
and repression, with sweeps and round-ups. "46 
So it is not clear how law enforcement will be able to 
repair the damage drug dealing imposes on local 
communities, and what the larger social costs are of an 
expanded police effort in this direction. Everywhere we 
looked police are seeking counsel and support from 
private citizens and community organizations, both for 
identifying the problem and for taking steps within the 
community itself to resolve at least a portion of it. 
Everywhere police departments are, with greater or lesser 
success, trying to organize community-based crime 
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prevention activities, ranging from organized public 
surveillance such as Neighborhood Watch, to 
informational newsletters, to groups which will wipe out 
graffiti. In addition, most police departments have 
reoriented a portion of traditional patrol activities in favor 
of pro-active anti-drug and gang enforcement. 
These activities are media favorites. Nothing is more 
telegenic than a raid on a crackhouse. The television 
media and the police seem to be in an almost symbiotic 
relationship in this respect. The raid shows the police 
actively and forcefully engaged in anti-drug activity, 
while the media's need for dramatic action to capture the 
viewers attention is fulfilled.47 At the same time, in every 
community we studied, the police are themselves 
increasingly and acutely aware of the limits of law 
enforcement. New York's Narcotics Chief John Hill 
summarizes a theme we heard time and again when he 
says, "The easiest thing to do is make an arrest for drugs. 
The hardest thing is to stop the drug trafficking." 
Increasingly, it would seem, police are coming to see the 
drug problem as a social, economic and educational issue, 
rather than primarily as a law enforcement responsibility. 
So too does the public. A Gallup poll released on June 21, 
1989, found that although crime is not on the rise, it is a 
major public concern, with 84 percent of the public 
believing that crime has risen in the past year. Fifty-eight 
percent of those interviewed believed that drugs are the 
major factor responsible for crime, but have little 
confidence in either the courts or the police to do anything 
about the problem. Although the public favors tough anti-
crime measures - for example, 54 percent favor tougher 
parole standards- only a minority (32 percent) advocate 
improved law enforcement as the best method to reduce 
crime. The overwhelming majority (61 percent) seem to 
appreciate the limits of law enforcement and advocate 
attacking social problems as the best method to reduce 
crime.48 
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